

## SEARCH REQUEST FORM

Requester's Full Name: AKASH K. SINGH Examiner #: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Art Unit: \_\_\_\_\_ Phone Number 30 \_\_\_\_\_ Serial Number: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mail Box and Bldg/Room Location: 1000 Results Format Preferred (circle): PAPER DISK E-MAIL

\*\*\*\*\*

**Title of Invention:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Inventors (please provide full names):**

Earliest Priority Filing Date:

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PTO-1590 (1-2000)

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**IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletins**

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**Search History**DATE: Friday, December 20, 2002 [Printable Copy](#) [Create Case](#)**Set Name Query**

side by side

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result set

DB=TDBD; PLUR=YES; OP=OR

<u>L6</u>	15 and 13	0	<u>L6</u>
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<u>L2</u>	bid or bids or bidding or bidder\$	39	<u>L2</u>
<u>L1</u>	auction\$ or dutchauction\$ or dutch adj auction\$ or reverse adj auction\$	2	<u>L1</u>

END OF SEARCH HISTORY

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Search Results - Record(s) 1 through 1 of 1 returned.

☐ 1. Document ID: NN73012624

L5: Entry 1 of 1

File: TDBD

Jan 1, 1973

TDB-ACC-NO: NN73012624

DISCLOSURE TITLE: Computer Games. January 1973.

## PUBLICATION-DATA:

IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin, January 1973, US

VOLUME NUMBER: 15

ISSUE NUMBER: 8

PAGE NUMBER: 2624

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Full	Title	CIT.1	REV.1	CLS.1	REF.1	SEQ.1	ATT.1

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11 and 12	1

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**WEST**[Generate Collection](#)[Print](#)**Search Results - Record(s) 1 through 2 of 2 returned.**☐ 1. Document ID: NA9402543

L1: Entry 1 of 2

File: TDBD

Feb 1, 1994

TDB-ACC-NO: NA9402543

DISCLOSURE TITLE: Approximate Joint Probabilistic Data Associations Algorithms

## PUBLICATION-DATA:

IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin, February 1994, US

VOLUME NUMBER: 37

ISSUE NUMBER: 2A

PAGE NUMBER: 543 - 546

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Full	Title	Citation	Front	Review	Classification	Date	Reference	Sequences	Attachments	Claims	KWIC
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☐ 2. Document ID: NN73012624

L1: Entry 2 of 2

File: TDBD

Jan 1, 1973

TDB-ACC-NO: NN73012624

DISCLOSURE TITLE: Computer Games. January 1973.

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VOLUME NUMBER: 15

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PAGE NUMBER: 2624

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S7	69126	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (HIGH? ? OR HIGHEST OR LOW? ? OR LOWEST OR COMPETITIVE? OR NON()COMPETITIVE?)
S8	816	S1(3N)S3
S9	625	S8 NOT (STOCK OR STOCKS)
S10	28	S9 NOT (BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING)
S11	17	S10 NOT PY>1999
S12	16	RD (unique items)
S13	86	S1(3N)S4
S14	8	S13 NOT (STOCK OR STOCKS OR BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING)
S15	3	S14 NOT PY>1999
S16	3	S15 NOT S12
S17	3	RD (unique items)
S18	19843	S1(5N)S5
S19	33	S18 NOT (BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR STOCK OR STOCKS)
S20	33	S19 NOT (S12 OR S17)
S21	26	S20 NOT PY>1999
S22	25	RD (unique items)
S23	139	S1(5N)S2(5N)S6
S24	139	S23 NOT (S12 OR S17 OR S22)
S25	101	S24 NOT PY>1999
S26	100	RD (unique items)
S27	0	S26(5N) (REWARD? OR PENALT?)
S28	3799	S1(5N)S2(5N)S7
S29	3475	S28 NOT (STOCK OR STOCKS)
S30	3462	S29 NOT (S12 OR S17 OR S22)
S31	2957	S30 NOT PY>1999
S32	13	S31(8N) (REWARD? OR PENALT?)
S33	13	RD (unique items)

?

12/3,K/1 (Item 1 from file: 476)  
DIALOG(R)File 476:Financial Times Fulltext  
(c) 2002 Financial Times Ltd. All rts. reserv.

0010058131 A199908171A3-C3-FT

**COMPANIES & FINANCE: ASIA-PACIFIC: Grosvenor in joint HK deal**

LOUISE LUCAS

Financial Times, London Ed2 ED, P 21

Tuesday, August 17, 1999

DOCUMENT TYPE: Stories; NEWSPAPER LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE:

FULLTEXT SECTION HEADING: COMPANIES & FINANCE: ASIA-PACIFIC

Word Count: 278

...sufficiently confident to buy into the sector since prices crashed.

Clement Fung, chairman of Asia **Standard**, said **encouraging** land **auction** sales and an increase in the sale of properties boded well for the future of...

12/3,K/2 (Item 2 from file: 476)  
DIALOG(R)File 476:Financial Times Fulltext  
(c) 2002 Financial Times Ltd. All rts. reserv.

0009045240 BOHLHAAAEYFT

**Companies and Finance: Argentina launches novel offer: International News Digest**

KEN WARN

Financial Times, London Edition 1 ED, P 24

Monday, December 8, 1997

DOCUMENT TYPE: Digests; NEWSPAPER LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE:

FULLTEXT

Word Count: 150

...300m bond offering with a novel variable interest rate spread structure determined by an annual **auction**.

If market **conditions** permit the **offer** to go ahead, it will allow Argentina to complete its 1997 borrowing programme, of which...

12/3,K/3 (Item 3 from file: 476)  
DIALOG(R)File 476:Financial Times Fulltext  
(c) 2002 Financial Times Ltd. All rts. reserv.

0008546079 BOGGJAAAC9FT

**News: UK: EU is the lure for Koreans in regions**

JOHN BURTON and STEFAN WAGSTYL

Financial Times, London Edition 1 ED, P 7

Wednesday, July 10, 1996

DOCUMENT TYPE: Stories; NEWSPAPER LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE:

FULLTEXT

Word Count: 507

...for training and site preparation as well as direct grants, do not breach UK Treasury **guidelines**. They also deny that LG **encouraged** any kind of **auction** between competing regions.

However, since details of the negotiations are confidential, the scale of the...

12/3,K/4 (Item 4 from file: 476)  
DIALOG(R)File 476:Financial Times Fulltext  
(c) 2002 Financial Times Ltd. All rts. reserv.

0008504416 BOGFKAAAAOFT

**News: Europe: Central bank attacks Yeltsin Dollars 1bn transfer**

JOHN THORNHILL

Financial Times, London Edition 1 ED, P 2

Tuesday, June 11, 1996

DOCUMENT TYPE: Stories; NEWSPAPER LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT

Word Count: 434

...16bn at the start of April.

The central bank has moved to raise banks' reserve **requirements** and suspended its Lombard **credit auctions** to commercial banks. 'Commercial banks' reaction could be quite negative, but we have to see...

12/3,K/5 (Item 5 from file: 476)

DIALOG(R)File 476:Financial Times Fulltext

(c) 2002 Financial Times Ltd. All rts. reserv.

0008011488 BOFEGANAEOFT

**Arts: Connoisseurs come back to the fold - The speculative element has disappeared from the UK antiques market**

ANTONY THORNCROFT

Financial Times, P XII

Saturday, May 6, 1995

DOCUMENT TYPE: NEWSPAPER LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT

Word Count: 931

...while Sotheby's reckons turnover is marginally higher. Anything really good, rare, and in excellent **condition** still commands a **premium**. The **auction** houses are much quicker to reject goods. But although auctions might be doing quite well...

12/3,K/6 (Item 1 from file: 710)

DIALOG(R)File 710:Times/Sun.Times(London)

(c) 2002 Times Newspapers. All rts. reserv.

12624107

**DANCER MUST TAKE QUICK STEPS;MONEY MAKEOVER;PROFILE;JOSEPHINE JEWKES**

Times of London (TL) - Sunday, May 4, 1997

By: Smita Talati

Section: Features

Word Count: 1,011

... sum would be no bad thing. However, Boyle argues that she should stop paying these **premiums**.

Her endowments are unit-linked **policies**, so Josephine cannot **auction** them on the traded endowment-policies market, leaving her with only one option: to surrender...

12/3,K/7 (Item 2 from file: 710)

DIALOG(R)File 710:Times/Sun.Times(London)

(c) 2002 Times Newspapers. All rts. reserv.

05690499

**THE PRICE OF AFFECTION; MOTORING**

Times of London (TL) - Friday May 11, 1990

By: Kevin Eason, Motoring Correspondent

Section: Features

Word Count: 293



TEXT:

A car with a wealth of history is driving to **auction** success

Vauxhall, mint **condition** , one careful lady owner, first **offer** up to Pounds 20,000 secures car ... only 66 years old. The Vauxhall 14/40...

12/3,K/8 (Item 3 from file: 710)  
DIALOG(R)File 710:Times/Sun.Times(London)  
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05684492

**BENEFIT BY PUTTING LIFE POLICY UNDER AUCTIONEER'S HAMMER; FAMILY MONEY**

Times of London (TL) - Saturday April 21, 1990

By: Sara McConnell

Section: Features

Word Count: 698

... to Policy Portfolio, Policy Network and Beale Dobie. Foster & Cranfield say these policies are rarely **auctioned** .

Unlike with-profits **policies** , they have no **bonuses** attached and are worth only what the underlying investments in the units are worth on...

12/3,K/9 (Item 1 from file: 492)  
DIALOG(R)File 492:Arizona Repub/Phoenix Gaz  
(c) 2002 Phoenix Newspapers. All rts. reserv.

10061097

**TOURNEY CHAIRMAN HAS HEART OF SURVIVOR**

Arizona Republic (AR) - Tuesday, March 2, 1999

By: Bill Huffman, AZ Golf

Edition: Final Chaser Section: AZ Golf Page: 10

Word Count: 1,335

**CAPTION:**

...One Pro-Am, at Superstition Mountain, 10 a.m. shotgun.

March 18 -- First round of **Standard** Register PING; Pro-Am **Awards** Dinner and Charity **Auction** , Arizona Biltmore, 6 p.m.

March 19 -- Second round.

March 20 -- Third round; Progresso Closest...

12/3,K/10 (Item 2 from file: 492)  
DIALOG(R)File 492:Arizona Repub/Phoenix Gaz  
(c) 2002 Phoenix Newspapers. All rts. reserv.

05513130

**\$53.9 MILLION VAN GOGH IS BACK ON THE MARKET SOTHEBY'S CURBS LENDING AFTER STIR OVER RECORD SALE**

ARIZONA REPUBLIC (AR) - SUNDAY January 14, 1990

By: Rita Reif, The New York Times

Edition: FINAL CHASER Section: LIFE AND LEISURE Page: E5

Word Count: 895

...healthy for Sotheby's."

The seller of Irises, John Whitney Payson, allowed Sotheby's to **offer** financing under the **condition** that the **auction** house assumed the risk. He was to be paid in full over six months whether...

12/3,K/11 (Item 1 from file: 631)

DIALOG(R)File 631:Boston Globe  
(c) 2002 Boston Globe. All rts. reserv.

03151086

**AN OFFER THEY COULD REFUSE**

BOSTON GLOBE (BG) - SATURDAY June 22, 1985  
By: Robert A. Jordan, Globe Staff  
Edition: THIRD Section: METRO Page: 21  
Word Count: 748

... rejected offer represents bad news to community housing activists who were able to attach two **conditions** to Mongan's **offer** - stop the **auction** of 266 other units of Granite Properties to the highest bidder, and rescind the sale...

12/3,K/12 (Item 1 from file: 725)

DIALOG(R)File 725:(Cleveland)Plain Dealer  
(c) 2000 The Plain Dealer. All rts. reserv.

07198014

**WOLF'S ALTERS AUCTION POLICY ALSO OFFERS ARTWORKS, COLLECTIBLES FOR SALE DAILY**

Plain Dealer (Cleveland) (PD) - Saturday, July 17, 1993  
By: HELEN CULLINAN PLAIN DEALER ART CRITIC  
Edition: FINAL / ALL Section: TODAY Page: 3E  
Word Count: 431

**WOLF'S ALTERS AUCTION POLICY ALSO OFFERS ARTWORKS, COLLECTIBLES FOR SALE DAILY**

12/3,K/13 (Item 2 from file: 725)

DIALOG(R)File 725:(Cleveland)Plain Dealer  
(c) 2000 The Plain Dealer. All rts. reserv.

06254088

**INTERNATIONAL**

Plain Dealer (Cleveland) (PD) - Wednesday, September 11, 1991  
By: FROM WIRE REPORTS  
Edition: FINAL / ALL Section: BUSINESS Page: F1  
Word Count: 493

...is the first to address the markets since Salomon Brothers Inc. admitted it had broken **rules** in Treasury **auctions**.

**TRADER BONUSES**

Paul Mozer, former head of government trading for Salomon Brothers, got \$6.6 million in...

12/3,K/14 (Item 1 from file: 625)

DIALOG(R)File 625:American Banker Publications  
(c) 2002 American Banker. All rts. reserv.

0145194

**Treasury Eyes Auction Award 'Guarantees'**

American Banker - April 14, 1994; Pg. 2; Vol. 159, No. 71  
WORD COUNT: 105

**TEXT:**

...security at the average auction price to a customer could be used to circumvent," a **rule** limiting **auction awards** to a single bidder to 35%.

. According to a report from Under Secretary Frank Newman...

12/3,K/15 (Item 1 from file: 139)

DIALOG(R)File 139:EconLit

(c) 2002 American Economic Association. All rts. reserv.

329871

**TITLE: The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After**

AUTHOR(S): Laffont, Jean-Jacques

AUTHOR(S) AFFILIATION: U Sciences Sociales

JOURNAL NAME: Econometrica,

JOURNAL VOLUME & ISSUE: 62 3,

PAGES: 507-37

PUBLICATION DATE: May 1994

ISSN: 0012-9682

DOCUMENT TYPE: Journal Article

ABSTRACT INDICATOR: Abstract

...ABSTRACT: optimal contracts by a menu of linear contracts, the dichotomy between pricing and cost reimbursement **rules**, the **auctioning** of **incentive** contracts, the dynamics of contracting under limited commitment, and the hierarchical problems in regulation. Empirical...

12/3,K/16 (Item 1 from file: 635)

DIALOG(R)File 635:Business Dateline(R)

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0801019 97-61006

**New Disclaimer Warns Bidders for FCC Licenses**

Mills, Mike

Washington Post (Washington, DC, US) pC.01

PUBL DATE: 970415

WORD COUNT: 260

DATELINE: Washington, DC, US, South Atlantic

TEXT:

...to require potential bidders who seek partners in licenses to provide investors with all FCC **rules** involving the **auctions** .

**Credit** : Washington Post Staff Writer

?

..17/3,K/1 (Item 1 from file: 631)  
DIALOG(R)File 631:Boston Globe  
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06279056

**FREDDIE MAC FINES SALOMON**

Boston Globe (BG) - SATURDAY, October 5, 1991  
Edition: THIRD Section: BUSINESS Page: 16  
Word Count: 136

**TEXT:**

SALOMON INC., EMBROILED in a scandal for breaking US Treasury **auction rules** , said it would pay a **penalty** to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. to avoid sanctions in a separate debt scandal...

17/3,K/2 (Item 1 from file: 633)  
DIALOG(R)File 633:Phil.Inquirer  
(c) 2002 Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. All rts. reserv.

03032495

**CHIPPENDALE PIECE MADE HERE COULD SET A RECORD AT AUCTION**

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (PI) - SUNDAY May 19, 1985  
By: Lita Solis-Cohen, Inquirer Antiques Writer  
Edition: FINAL Section: FEATURES BOOKS / LEISURE Page: G11  
Word Count: 780

...over the years.

Even though its attribution may not be firm, the highboy to be **auctioned** is in **fine condition** and its provenance is clear. It descended from Levi and Hannah Hollingsworth through their granddaughter...

17/3,K/3 (Item 1 from file: 735)  
DIALOG(R)File 735:St. Petersburg Times  
(c) 2000 St. Petersburg Times. All rts. reserv.

09061060

**"CHEERLEADER MOM' FREE AFTER 6 MONTHS**

St. Petersburg Times (PE) - SATURDAY March 1, 1997  
By: Compiled from Times Wires  
Edition: 0 SOUTH PINELLAS Section: NATIONAL Page: 4A  
Word Count: 463

... long-standing complaints from minority farmers and department employees of discriminatory treatment, ""a zero-tolerance **policy** for **reprisals** "" and a **policy** to suspend foreclosure **auctions** in cases that allege loan discrimination.

Black farmers picketed the department headquarters last fall to...  
?

22/3,K/1 (Item 1 from file: 476)  
DIALOG(R)File 476:Financial Times Fulltext  
(c) 2002 Financial Times Ltd. All rts. reserv.

0009043239 BOHLPAGAG1FT

**Lex Column: Diageo**

Financial Times, London Edition 1 ED, P 16

Tuesday, December 16, 1997

DOCUMENT TYPE: LEX column; NEWSPAPER LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT

Word Count: 253

...and Bombay. Allied Domecq, Seagram and Pernod Ricard are already on the list of potential **bidders**. In **auction conditions** Dewar's, number one in the US scotch market, might well sell for more than...

22/3,K/2 (Item 2 from file: 476)  
DIALOG(R)File 476:Financial Times Fulltext  
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0006514056 BOCIDIBFAAFFT

**Mexico to privatise two TV stations**

DAMIAN FRASER

Financial Times, P 4

Wednesday, April 8, 1992

DOCUMENT TYPE: NEWSPAPER LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT

Word Count: 272

...its pay-as-you-view Multivision channel, is likely to be one of the strongest **bidders**, given that Televisa has been **ruled** out of the **auction**.

El Nacional, funded and owned by the government, closely follows the official line in editorials...

22/3,K/3 (Item 3 from file: 476)  
DIALOG(R)File 476:Financial Times Fulltext  
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0005549839 BOAIYBRAGAFT

**EC heads for clash over airline proposals**

TIM DICKSON

Financial Times, P 22

Tuesday, September 25, 1990

DOCUMENT TYPE: NEWSPAPER LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT

Word Count: 466

...although the development of new airports has eased the situation.

The most radical European solution - **auctioning** airport slots to the highest **bidder** - has been **ruled** out in Brussels on the grounds that it would almost certainly reinforce the stronger airlines...

22/3,K/4 (Item 4 from file: 476)  
DIALOG(R)File 476:Financial Times Fulltext  
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0005547562 BOAJEBKABEFT

**Dogfight for EC airport space: How bureaucrats and airlines are at odds over slots**

PAUL BETTS and TIM DICKSON

Financial Times, P 27  
Friday, October 5, 1990  
DOCUMENT TYPE: NEWSPAPER LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT  
Word Count: 1,064

...of their existing rights.

There are three main options. The most radical would be to **auction** slots, selling to the highest **bidder**. This has not been officially **ruled** out, but it is considered unlikely on the ground that it could harm the smaller ...

22/3,K/5 (Item 1 from file: 710)  
DIALOG(R)File 710:Times/Sun.Times(London)  
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09524082  
**CLINTON UNDER FIRE OVER AIDE'S HELP FOR ASIAN FUNDER**  
Times of London (TL) - Friday, January 24, 1997  
By: Tom Rhodes in Washington  
Section: Overseas news  
Word Count: 384

... the smoking gun that Republicans have been seeking in their attempts to prove that American **policy** was **auctioned** to the highest **bidder** during last year's campaign.

The deal involved Maria Haley, one of the President's...

22/3,K/6 (Item 1 from file: 711)  
DIALOG(R)File 711:Independent(London)  
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10840177  
**LAW REPORT: CONSTRUCTION OF A HOUSE ON BARE SITE WAS NOT AN 'IMPROVEMENT'**  
Independent (IN) - Tuesday, December 5, 2000  
By: Kate O'Hanlon  
Edition: FOREIGN Section: Comment Page: 2  
Word Count: 667

... of the Camden Charities put the site of the Kensington Workhouse up for sale by **auction**. The successful **bidder**, Mr Inderwick, entered into an **agreement** with the trustees whereby he undertook to construct 29 houses on the site on completion...

22/3,K/7 (Item 1 from file: 387)  
DIALOG(R)File 387:The Denver Post  
(c) 2002 Denver Post. All rts. reserv.

00681013 (USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**LETTERS, FAXES & E-MAIL**  
Denver Post, SUN1 ED, P E-05  
Sunday, June 15, 1997  
DOCUMENT TYPE: NEWSPAPER; LETTER LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE:  
FULLTEXT SECTION HEADING: PERSPECTIVE  
Word Count: 2,624

(USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULLTEXT)

...cost populations" like abused, neglected or retarded children. The smell of federal money attracts peculiar **bidders** to the **policy auction** - they speak of humans as if they were

commodities or livestock.  
Mr. Kenneth Mazik, who...

22/3,K/8 (Item 1 from file: 631)  
DIALOG(R)File 631:Boston Globe  
(c) 2002 Boston Globe. All rts. reserv.

09739109

**NURSING HOME WINS MORTGAGE REPRIEVE**  
Boston Globe (BG) - THURSDAY, August 27, 1998  
By: Stephen Kiehl, Globe Correspondent  
Edition: Third Section: Metro Page: E8  
Word Count: 302

TEXT:

A day before the city's only minority-operated nursing home was to be **auctioned** to the highest **bidder**, its trustees reached an **agreement** with the company holding its mortgage to give the home two more months to get...

22/3,K/9 (Item 2 from file: 631)  
DIALOG(R)File 631:Boston Globe  
(c) 2002 Boston Globe. All rts. reserv.

03174165

**IT TOOK 10 YEARS, BUT APARTMENTS BECOME A CO-OP**  
BOSTON GLOBE (BG) - MONDAY October 14, 1985  
By: Michael K. Frisby, Globe Staff  
Edition: THIRD Section: METRO Page: 26  
Word Count: 584

... Department of Housing and Urban Development to allow it to buy the building rather than **auction** it to the highest **bidder**.

Neil Sullivan, **policy** adviser to Mayor Flynn, was among the public officials who attended the celebration and told...

22/3,K/10 (Item 1 from file: 633)  
DIALOG(R)File 633:Phil.Inquirer  
(c) 2002 Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. All rts. reserv.

10031098

**ONLINE AUCTION BUYERS LEFT TO PROTECT THEMSELVES FROM FRAUD**  
Philadelphia Inquirer (PI) - Sunday, January 31, 1999  
By: John Hendren, ASSOCIATED PRESS  
Edition: D Section: BUSINESS Page: D03  
Word Count: 688

TEXT:

...the prestigious auction house apologized and bought it back.

On the explosive frontier of Internet **auctions**, the **policy** is different: **bidder** beware.

22/3,K/11 (Item 1 from file: 638)  
DIALOG(R)File 638:Newsday/New York Newsday  
(c) 2002 Newsday Inc. All rts. reserv.

09763091

**RENO ON SUNDAY / Sideshow Obscures the Real Scandal / The money that fuels the hunger for power is the really sexy story**

Newsday (ND) - Sunday September 20, 1998  
By: Robert Reno  
Edition: ALL EDITIONS Section: MONEY & CAREERS Page: F07  
Word Count: 715

... lobbyists representing these and many other interests, Congress is increasingly in danger of becoming an **auction** house where public **policies** are sold to the highest **bidder**."

How touchingly naive of the Center for Public Integrity to suppose that Congress isn't...

22/3,K/12 (Item 2 from file: 638)  
DIALOG(R)File 638:Newsday/New York Newsday  
(c) 2002 Newsday Inc. All rts. reserv.

06281127

**DOCUMENTING ACTION BY THE HOMELESS**

Newsday (ND) - Wednesday October 2, 1991  
By: Jonathan Mandell. STAFF WRITER  
Edition: CITY Section: PART II Page: 51  
Word Count: 747

... they disrupted an auction of some of those homes to real estate speculators; HUD's **auctions** to the highest **bidder** persist despite a **requirement** in the 1987 Housing Act that HUD use the empty homes "to assist the homeless...

22/3,K/13 (Item 3 from file: 638)  
DIALOG(R)File 638:Newsday/New York Newsday  
(c) 2002 Newsday Inc. All rts. reserv.

06113108

**RUNNING ON EMPTY SUFFOLK HALPIN CUTS \$11.1M MORE, DRAWING FIRE**

Newsday (ND) - Saturday April 20, 1991  
By: Dan Fagin. STAFF WRITER  
Edition: NASSAU AND SUFFOLK Section: NEWS Page: 03QUOTE:  
Word Count: 859

...a Halpin-proposed plan to raise an estimated \$1.3 million by temporarily dropping a **requirement** that winning **bidders** at county **auctions** of tax-delinquent homes agree to live there for at least five years.

The six...

22/3,K/14 (Item 1 from file: 702)  
DIALOG(R)File 702:Miami Herald  
(c) 2002 The Miami Herald Publishing Co. All rts. reserv.

07646110

**DEATH OF REFORM**

Miami Herald (MH) - THU October 6, 1994  
By: Herald Staff  
Edition: FINAL Section: EDITORIAL Page: 24A  
Word Count: 414

...pour into congressional campaign coffers and to rid Congress of the onus of seeming to **auction** public **policy** to the highest **bidder** -- is over. It was killed in the Senate by a Republican filibuster on a procedural...

22/3,K/15 (Item 2 from file: 702)



DIALOG(R)File 702:Miami Herald  
(c) 2002 The Miami Herald Publishing Co. All rts. reserv.

06112919

**THE UNWISDOM OF SALOMON**

Miami Herald (MH) - WED August 21, 1991  
By: Herald Staff  
Edition: FINAL Section: EDITORIAL Page: 16A  
Word Count: 364

... this one has a ready remedy. Treasury officials and Representative Markey are considering improved market **regulation** and opportunity for more **bidders** to compete at Government-bond **auctions** . Both are overdue.

But as overdue reform follows overdue reform, the new growth industry of...

**22/3,K/16 (Item 1 from file: 703)**  
DIALOG(R)File 703:USA Today  
(c) 2002 USA Today. All rts. reserv.

08642519

**Report: Interests are running Congress**  
USA TODAY (US) - THURSDAY September 10, 1998  
By: Jim Drinkard  
Edition: FINAL Section: NEWS Page: 07A  
Word Count: 485

**TEXT:**

WASHINGTON -- Congress is in danger of becoming an `` **auction** house'' where public **policy** is sold to the highest **bidder** , a study charges. The report amounts to a harsh assessment of the impact of special...

**22/3,K/17 (Item 1 from file: 704)**  
DIALOG(R)File 704:(Portland)The Oregonian  
(c) 2002 The Oregonian. All rts. reserv.

07718131

**REVITALIZE OREGON DEMOCRACY: VOTE FOR CAMPAIGN-SPENDING RESTRICTIONS**  
Oregonian (PO) - SATURDAY, August 6, 1994  
Edition: FOURTH Section: EDITORIAL Page: D13  
Word Count: 190

**TEXT:**

... there are no limits, as other states have learned, the legislative process degenerates into an **auction** of public **policy** , with the highest **bidder** determining the winners in most races and setting the agendas of our legislators.

**22/3,K/18 (Item 2 from file: 704)**  
DIALOG(R)File 704:(Portland)The Oregonian  
(c) 2002 The Oregonian. All rts. reserv.

05131200

**STATES PLAN JOINT PUBLIC HEARING ON BUOY 10 SALMON SEASON DATES**  
OREGONIAN (PO) - THURSDAY May 11, 1989  
Edition: FOURTH Section: Sports Page: E07  
Word Count: 563

...property at Point of Rocks.

BIGHORN AUCTION: Revised rules for holding a bighorn sheep tag **auction**

and **regulations** governing the successful tag **bidder** are on the Oregon Fish & Wildlife Commission's agenda for its Friday public hearing.

The...

22/3,K/19 (Item 1 from file: 735)  
DIALOG(R)File 735:St. Petersburg Times  
(c) 2000 St. Petersburg Times. All rts. reserv.

08169005

**HOMES NEWS**

St. Petersburg Times (PE) - SATURDAY June 17, 1995  
Edition: CITY Section: FLORIDIAN Page: 2D  
Word Count: 409

**TEXT:**

...agree to live in them for a year, not to investors.

To participate in the **auction**, which will be in Orlando, **bidders** must be certified for income **qualification** and prequalified for financing by Consumer Credit Counseling Service, a non-profit United Way agency...

22/3,K/20 (Item 1 from file: 626)  
DIALOG(R)File 626:Bond Buyer Full Text  
(c) 2002 Bond Buyer. All rts. reserv.

0123052

**The Treasury May Change Auction Rules, But Seeks to Avoid Disruption of Market**

The Bond Buyer - July 11, 1991; Pg. 3(207); Vol. 297, No. 28687  
Word Count: 710

**BYLINE:**

By Stephen A. Davies

**TEXT:**

...Corp., according to a recent market letter by analysts at Griggs & Santow Inc.

Under current **auction rules**, a **bidder** may acquire up to 35% of any issue, but primary dealers may purchase a larger...

22/3,K/21 (Item 2 from file: 626)  
DIALOG(R)File 626:Bond Buyer Full Text  
(c) 2002 Bond Buyer. All rts. reserv.

0038602

**RADIN ON POWER**

The Bond Buyer - June 11, 1984, Monday; Pg. 10  
Word Count: 1,574

**BYLINE:**

By Peter McKenna

**TEXT:**

...to what the industry is calling the "Boxer Rebellion." She proposed that federal power be **auctioned** off to the highest **bidder** rather than the traditional **policy** of selling it at sufficient rates to amortize the cost of the project to the...

. 22/3,K/22 (Item 1 from file: 139)  
DIALOG(R)File 139:EconLit  
(c) 2002 American Economic Association. All rts. reserv.

310498

**TITLE: A Characterization of Equilibria in Common Value Second-Price and Open-Exit Auctions**

AUTHOR(S): Bikhchandani, Sushil; Riley, John G.

AUTHOR(S) AFFILIATION: UCLA; UCLA

PUBLICATION INFORMATION: University of California at Los Angeles Anderson Graduate School of Management Business Economics Working Paper: 88-2

PAGES: 34

PUBLICATION DATE: April 1988

AVAILABILITY: Copies available from: 6249C Anderson Graduate School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1481

PRICE: \$2.00; checks payable to U.C. Regents

DOCUMENT TYPE: Working Paper

ABSTRACT INDICATOR: Abstract

...ABSTRACT: identified. We establish that there exists a continuum of equilibria in open-exit, common value **auctions**. For the case of two **bidders**, we provide plausible sufficient **conditions** under which the expected seller revenue is maximized at the symmetric equilibrium. An example in...

22/3,K/23 (Item 2 from file: 139)  
DIALOG(R)File 139:EconLit  
(c) 2002 American Economic Association. All rts. reserv.

245935

**TITLE: Equilibria in Open Common Value Auctions**

AUTHOR(S): Bikhchandani, Sushil; Riley, John G.

AUTHOR(S) AFFILIATION: UCLA; UCLA

JOURNAL NAME: Journal of Economic Theory,

JOURNAL VOLUME & ISSUE: 53 1,

PAGES: 101-30

PUBLICATION DATE: February 1991

DOCUMENT TYPE: Journal Article

ABSTRACT INDICATOR: Abstract

...ABSTRACT: The authors establish that there exists a continuum of equilibria in irrevocable exit, common value **auctions**. For the case of two **bidders**, the authors provide plausible sufficient **conditions** under which the expected seller revenue is maximized at the symmetric equilibrium. An example in...

22/3,K/24 (Item 1 from file: 635)  
DIALOG(R)File 635:Business Dateline(R)  
(c) 2002 ProQuest Info&Learning. All rts. reserv.

0598223 95-54364

**Chapel Square Mall deal approved**

Capot, Chris

New Haven Register (New Haven, CT, US) sA p1

PUBL DATE: 950418

WORD COUNT: 591

DATELINE: New Haven, CT, US

TEXT:

...probably would have closed, could have left the property vulnerable to purchase by the highest **bidder** at **auction**.

. In an **agreement** worked out with Rouse's cooperation, the mall's ownership will in the next few...

22/3,K/25 (Item 2 from file: 635)  
DIALOG(R)File 635:Business Dateline(R)  
(c) 2002 ProQuest Info&Learning. All rts. reserv.

0141339 90-24335

**Some Fear 20% Off Sale Will Stop Local Rebound**

Blanton, Kimberly

Dallas Times Herald (Dallas, TX, US), V111 N129 sA p1

PUBL DATE: 900509

WORD COUNT: 693

DATELINE: Dallas, TX, US

TEXT:

...be reduced an additional 5 percent. The unsold properties then could be sold in public **auctions** to the highest **bidder**. The **policy** gives local RTC officials leeway to decide price reductions on a case-by-case basis...

?

33/3,K/1 (Item 1 from file: 476)  
DIALOG(R)File 476:Financial Times Fulltext  
(c) 2002 Financial Times Ltd. All rts. reserv.

0008011854 B0FEEEFAB6FT

**ITC to probe Channel 5 collusion claim**

RAYMOND SNODDY

Financial Times, P 8

Friday, May 5, 1995

DOCUMENT TYPE: NEWSPAPER LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT

Word Count: 640

...inside knowledge would have been much more likely to have led to an outright winning **bid** from one of them than a tie.

If CanWest, the **highest bidder** at more than Pounds 36m a year was to be excluded - for **bidding** too **high** - and Channel 5 Broadcasting and Virgin were to meet all the ITC **requirements**, there could be a **penalty** shoot-out with the tied two being asked for further bids. Before that, the ITC...

33/3,K/2 (Item 1 from file: 631)  
DIALOG(R)File 631:Boston Globe  
(c) 2002 Boston Globe. All rts. reserv.

01658584

**FERRY AUTHORITY AUTONOMY UNDER FIRE AGAIN ON CAPE**

BOSTON GLOBE (BG) - SUNDAY April 22, 1984

By: Gary Ghioto, Globe Correspondent

Edition: N Section: RUN OF PAPER

Word Count: 1,388

...terminal.

Critics say the Oak Bluffs wharf project is an example of the authority's **policy** of **rewarding** friends with contracts.

Without following open and **competitive bidding** law, the authority with Ferro's urging hired two local contractors for a \$170,000...

33/3,K/3 (Item 1 from file: 638)  
DIALOG(R)File 638:Newsday/New York Newsday  
(c) 2002 Newsday Inc. All rts. reserv.

08166150

**Building Advantage For Women Are preferences fair to both sexes?**

Newsday (ND) - Thursday June 15, 1995

By: Anemona Hartocollis. STAFF WRITER

Edition: CITY Section: NEWS Page: A08

Word Count: 2,553

...succeeded, she says, through her sharply honed estimating skills and her ability to predict the **low bid**.

In 1993, HHM Associates, a male-owned contracting firm, offered to form a joint venture...

...Ask me if it's unfair," she insists, agitated by the very idea of being **rewarded** for something other than the quality of her work. "I do feel it's unfair..."

... women are perceived as having gotten their jobs because of their sex,

rather than their **qualifications** , a judgment, no matter how untrue, that is hard to live down.

Despite such qualms... Set-asides give women and minorities a 10 percent price preference, meaning that they may **bid** 10 percent higher than the **lowest bidder** and still win the job. (Mayor Rudolph Giuliani abolished the city's 10-percent price...

33/3,K/4 (Item 2 from file: 638)  
DIALOG(R)File 638:Newsday/New York Newsday  
(c) 2002 Newsday Inc. All rts. reserv.

06123149

**LILCO'S REVERSAL OF FORTUNES AFTER YEARS OF WORRY, POWER PROBLEMS EASE**

Newsday (ND) - Tuesday April 30, 1991

By: Kinsey Wilson. STAFF WRITER

Edition: NASSAU AND SUFFOLK Section: NEWS Page: 03

Word Count: 2,191

... years that encourage utilities to meet electric demand through a system of energy conservation and **competitive bidding** .

LILCO, meanwhile, as the utility with the franchise to supply Long Island, is left to...

... power plant in Holtsville, the price would go up and there would be "significant ratepayer **penalties** ." Flynn's remarks seemed calculated to force a decision on the Holtsville project before the...

... Commission - the agency that regulates the state's investor-owned utilities - continues to stand by **policies** developed over the past several years that encourage utilities to meet electric demand through a system of energy conservation and **competitive bidding** .

LILCO, meanwhile, as the utility with the franchise to supply Long Island, is left to...

33/3,K/5 (Item 1 from file: 702)  
DIALOG(R)File 702:Miami Herald  
(c) 2002 The Miami Herald Publishing Co. All rts. reserv.

10321010

**MIA CONSTRUCTION WAGES INCREASED**

Miami Herald (MH) - Wednesday, November 17, 1999

By: DON FINEFROCK, dfinefrock@herald.com

Edition: Final Section: Local Page: 3B

Word Count: 496

... companies. With certain exceptions, the measure requires developers to match the wages now paid on **competitively bid** county construction contracts.

Those wages are established quarterly based on collective bargaining **agreements** , said Miriam Singer, assistant director of the county's Department of Business Development.

County officials...

...create jobs.

Developers who do not deliver the promised jobs will be subject to a **penalty** equal to 20 percent of the construction cost. .

Asked to name projects that will be...

... Barbara Carey-Shuler, sponsor of the ordinance, said she would have

preferred to apply the **requirement** to projects of less than \$1 million, but was pleased with the compromise.

``I am...

... Handicapped - decided Monday the county must negotiate with Goodwill Industries of South Florida before inviting **competitive bids**.

Passed an ordinance requiring pet shops, kennels and veterinarians to post signs warning customers that...

...people to report illegal pit bulls to the county.

Awarded an \$80,000 contract without **competitive bidding** to L&L Consulting for security at Miami International Airport. L&L is headed by...

33/3,K/6 (Item 2 from file: 702)

DIALOG(R)File 702:Miami Herald

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08764082

#### **COURT RULING MAY CRIPPLE BLACK FIRMS**

Miami Herald (MH) - Friday, September 20, 1996

By: ROBERT L. STEINBACK Herald Columnist

Edition: FINAL Section: LOCAL Page: 1B

Word Count: 579

... would argue that any race-conscious policy is discriminatory and therefore unacceptable. A race-neutral **policy**, they'd say, would **reward** the most competent companies who submit the **lowest bids**.

But the construction industry, dominated by a relatively small number of powerful general contractors, isn...

33/3,K/7 (Item 3 from file: 702)

DIALOG(R)File 702:Miami Herald

(c) 2002 The Miami Herald Publishing Co. All rts. reserv.

08616261

#### **SHORT CHANGED HOW A POLITICALLY CONNECTED FARMER OVERCHARGED DADE**

##### **GOVERNMENT FOR THOUSANDS OF UNDERSIZED PALMS**

Miami Herald (MH) - Thursday, April 25, 1996

By: TOM DUBOCQ Herald Staff Writer

Edition: FINAL Section: FRONT Page: 1A

Word Count: 2,714

... feet tall, worth \$40 less apiece. A Diaz competitor, Vila & Son Landscaping, put in a **low bid** of \$120 for that size tree -- and should have gotten the order if that was...

... County representatives didn't measure and handpick trees for the projects as permitted under the **agreement**.

Instead, Emilio Fontana, a county landscape architect, said he "eyeballed" a field of palms at...

...Cutie cut the \$31,725 bill for the ligustrums by \$1,586 -- a 5 percent **penalty**. Diaz was paid in full for the Christmas palms.

By that point, Miglio's boss...ROYAL PALMS

Metro's landscaping contracts call for palms to be measured using a state **standard** known as "overall height."

That's the distance from the base of the tree to...

...palms: 28-30 feet in overall height, 22-24 feet and 16-18 feet. The **low bid** prices of installed palms: \$300, \$250 and \$199, respectively.

To determine whether county taxpayers got...

**33/3,K/8 (Item 1 from file: 725)**  
DIALOG(R) File 725: (Cleveland) Plain Dealer  
(c) 2000 The Plain Dealer. All rts. reserv.

08744070

**TURNPIKE ACCOMPLISHMENTS BYPASSED**

Plain Dealer (Cleveland) (PD) - Saturday, August 31, 1996  
Edition: FINAL / ALL Section: EDITORIALS & FORUM Page: 10B  
Word Count: 363

... plazas and old interchanges - in fact, all turnpike construction - is being done to tightly drawn **specifications** by contractors who win the work through a sealed, **competitive - bidding** process that **rewards** the **low bidder**, keeping costs to a minimum. We are also controlling administrative costs by reducing the payroll...

**33/3,K/9 (Item 1 from file: 735)**  
DIALOG(R) File 735: St. Petersburg Times  
(c) 2000 St. Petersburg Times. All rts. reserv.

08723157

**STADIUM FINANCE DECISION DEFENDED**

St. Petersburg Times (PE) - SATURDAY August 10, 1996  
By: LARRY DOUGHERTY  
Edition: 2 LATE TAMPA Section: TAMPA & STATE Page: 3B  
Word Count: 476

... commissioners have criticized the authority's decision to choose a lead stadium bond underwriter, without **competitive bidding**, weeks before a Sept. 3 tax referendum that would pay for a new stadium. L...

...is getting the (financing) team in place.'

Pointing out that there would be stiff financial **penalties** if the new stadium was not completed on time, Anderson said the only reason he...

... Had the county been designated the issuer, Kleman said, "'we would have done it by **competitive bid**, after the election'" to keep in line with longstanding county financial **policy**. Kleman said the county would want to solicit bids based on a funding source voters...

**33/3,K/10 (Item 2 from file: 735)**  
DIALOG(R) File 735: St. Petersburg Times  
(c) 2000 St. Petersburg Times. All rts. reserv.

08723138

**STADIUM MANEUVER DEFENDED**

St. Petersburg Times (PE) - SATURDAY August 10, 1996  
By: LARRY DOUGHERTY  
Edition: 0 SOUTH PINELLAS Section: CITY & STATE Page: 4B  
Word Count: 491

... commissioners have criticized the authority's decision to choose a lead stadium bond underwriter, without **competitive bidding**, weeks before a Sept. 3 tax referendum that would pay for a new stadium. L...

...is getting the (financing) team in place.'



Pointing out that there would be stiff financial **penalties** if the new stadium was not completed on time, Anderson said the only reason he...

... Had the county been designated the issuer, Kleman said, "'we would have done it by **competitive bid**, after the election'" to keep in line with longstanding county financial **policy**. Kleman said the county would want to solicit bids based on a funding source voters...

33/3,K/11 (Item 1 from file: 268)  
DIALOG(R)File 268:Banking Info Source  
(c) 2002 ProQuest Info&Learning. All rts. reserv.

00300856 (USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**Thin pickings in a buoyant market**  
Peagam, Norman  
Euromoney, v331, p97-102, Nov 1996 DOCUMENT TYPE: Journal Article  
LANGUAGE: English RECORD TYPE: Abstract Fulltext  
WORD COUNT: 02857

(USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULLTEXT)  
... also provide local currency financing for up to 17 years. "This was probably the most **competitive** IPP **bidding** in the world," says a banker who monitored the process.

In addition to aggressive pricing...

...generation were too investor-friendly. China has always taken a fairly hard line over the **conditions** it will approve. Now Taiwan, new to private electricity development, seems to be taking an...

...it or leave it" terms, several bankers say.

Bankers themselves have played hardball at times, **rewarding** countries which were most accommodating. A few years ago, for example, the Philippines was so...because Chinese enterprises do not use western accounting methods, most are not profitable by western **standards** and in some cases wen their ownership is murky. To complicate matters, provinces are competing...

...for example, Bovis and Thames Water of the UK concluded a build-operate-transfer (BOT) **agreement** with Shanghai to install a water treatment plant at Da Chang and supply the city...IPPs. Instead, foreign and local companies have usually set up ad hoc joint ventures, negotiated **agreements** with provincial governments and power authorities and then sought the necessary approvals from the central...

...project in Guangxi province, the State Planning Commission (SPC) has for the first time written **guidelines** specifically designed to attract international participation. It has opened up the process to **competitive bidding** and will even allow a foreign company to own 100% of the operating company. Moreover...

33/3,K/12 (Item 1 from file: 635)  
DIALOG(R)File 635:Business Dateline(R)  
(c) 2002 ProQuest Info&Learning. All rts. reserv.

0277130 92-23479  
**Benvenuti Has Low Bid for AG**  
McCarthy, Mike  
The Business Journal-Sacramento (Sacramento, CA, US), V8 N49 s1 p1  
PUBL DATE: 920302  
WORD COUNT: 1,223  
DATELINE: Sacramento, CA, US

TEXT:

...have enough architectural flourishes to obtain city approval and attract other tenants?

\* And is the **low bid** --as some critics charge--just a come-on designed to get Benvenuti in the door...

...start construction before the end of this year. That also is how long their purchase **agreement** for the newspaper and property indicates the paper must be kept in business, according to...

...to about 100 unsecured creditors, in addition to its secured debts.

According to the sales **agreement**, the paper cannot be shut down or taken into bankruptcy before December, regardless of operating...

...of \$5 million or more before closing down and liquidating the paper, or face substantial **penalties**, including an immediate acceleration of all payment on the Union property, estimated by one source...

...a final decision on its 210,000-square-foot lease in late March.

Benvenuti's **low bid** beat out some highpowered competition, including the partners in recently completed Park Plaza Tower, the...

33/3,K/13 (Item 2 from file: 635)  
DIALOG(R)File 635:Business Dateline(R)  
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0184490 91-05673

City Yanks Contract From Dillingham

Flaherty, Colin

San Diego Business Journal (San Diego, CA, US), V11 N51 s1 p1

PUBL DATE: 901217

WORD COUNT: 647

DATELINE: San Diego, CA, US

TEXT:

...largest inflicted on a company for failing to comply with the city's affirmative action **policies**, city officials said.

Dillingham submitted in September the **low bid** for the Alvarado Filtration Plant-Joint Laboratory Facility, one of the most expensive projects ever...

...Equal Opportunity Programs," Pratt said. "Such a history of callousness, or callous disregard, cannot be **rewarded**."

Lockwood said that "the bottom-line issue here is the proof is in the pudding..."

...sexual quotas -- a practice recently outlawed by the U.S. Supreme Court. San Diego's **policies** are goals that a company must make a "good faith" effort to meet, even if it does not reach them, Lockwood said.

The next **lowest bid** on the project was \$10.5 million by M.H. Golden. But the council cannot take that offer because state law compels the city to accept only the **lowest bid**. The project will be readvertised. Members of the Citizens Equal Opportunity Commission praised the  
...  
?

File 344:Chinese Patents Abs Aug 1985-2002/Nov  
(c) 2002 European Patent Office  
File 347:JAPIO Oct 1976-2002/Aug(Updated 021203)  
(c) 2002 JPO & JAPIO  
File 350:Derwent WPIX 1963-2002/UD,UM &UP=200281  
(c) 2002 Thomson Derwent

?ds

Set	Items	Description
S1	2001	(AUCTION? OR DUTCHAUCTION? OR DUTCH()AUCTION? OR REVERSE()-AUCTION?) OR EBAY OR ONLINE()COM OR "ONLINE.COM"
S2	176	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (5N) (RULE? ? OR POLICY - OR POLICIES OR CONDITION? ? OR AGREEMENT? OR GUIDELINE? OR GUIDE()LINE? OR PARAMETER? OR REQUIREMENT? OR SPECS? OR SPECIFICATION? OR REGULATION? OR QUALIFICATION?)
S3	16	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (LEVEL OR LEVELS OR BEHAVIOR? OR BEHAVIOUR? OR SUBMISS?)
S4	244	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (HIGH? ? OR HIGHEST OR LOW? ? OR LOWEST OR COMPETITIVE? OR NON()COMPETITIVE?)
S5	221	S1 AND (S2 OR S3 OR S4)
S6	2	S5 AND (REWARD? OR PENALT?)

6/5/1 (Item 1 from file: 350)  
DIALOG(R)File 350:Derwent WPIX  
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013507138 \*\*Image available\*\*  
WPI Acc No: 2000-679082/200066  
XRPX Acc No: N00-502740

Competitive bidding rewarding method on-line auction , involves  
qualifying bidder to receive reward , when his bid is greater than that  
of remaining bids

Patent Assignee: WALKER DIGITAL LLC (WALK-N)  
Inventor: TEDESCO D E; VAN LUCHENE A S; WALKER J S  
Number of Countries: 087 Number of Patents: 002  
Patent Family:

Patent No	Kind	Date	Applicat No	Kind	Date	Week
WO 200041108	A1	20000713	WO 99US23901	A	19991014	200066 B
AU 200012044	A	20000724	AU 200012044	A	19991014	200066

Priority Applications (No Type Date): US 98223901 A 19981231

Patent Details:

Patent No	Kind	Lan	Pg	Main IPC	Filing Notes
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WO 200041108	A1	E	46	G06F-017/60	
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Designated States (National): AE AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY CA CH CN  
CU CZ DE DK EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ  
LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MD MG MK MN MW MX NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG SI SK  
SL TJ TM TR TT UA UG US UZ VN YU ZA ZW

Designated States (Regional): AT BE CH CY DE DK EA ES FI FR GB GH GM GR  
IE IT KE LS LU MC MW NL OA PT SD SE SL SZ TZ UG ZW

AU 200012044	A			G06F-017/60	Based on patent WO 200041108
--------------	---	--	--	-------------	------------------------------

Abstract (Basic): WO 200041108 A1

NOVELTY - The product for bidding is identified and the bid for product is received from a bidder, during **auction** session. When the bid from bidder is greater than that of remaining bids, it is determined whether the bidder is qualified to receive a **reward** , based on the **reward rule** . If the **bidder** is qualified, an indication is transmitted to the bidder.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION - The **reward** includes value of currency, supplement to bit, rebate on the product, amount of frequent flier miles, secondary product, service and warranty for the product, etc.

INDEPENDENT CLAIMS are also included for the following:

- (a) method of providing **penalty** to bidder;
- (b) method of participation in **auction** session;
- (c) apparatus for **rewarding** bidder;
- (d) apparatus for providing **penalty** to bidder;
- (e) program product

USE - For **rewarding** bidder in on line **auction** environment during sale of luxury items, antiques or high ticket items via LAN, WAN, internet, intranet, public telephone exchange system, etc.

ADVANTAGE - Encourages **competitive bidding** and discourages unreasonable bit submission by providing **reward** or **penalty** to bidder.

DESCRIPTION OF DRAWING(S) - The figure shows the flowchart illustrating the steps performed by **auction** server.

pp; 46 DwgNo 9/10

Title Terms: COMPETE; BID; METHOD; LINE; **AUCTION** ; QUALIFY; RECEIVE;  
**REWARD** ; BID; GREATER; REMAINING; BID

Derwent Class: T01

International Patent Class (Main): G06F-017/60

File Segment: EPI

6/5/2 (Item 2 from file: 350)  
DIALOG(R)File 350:Derwent WPIX  
(c) 2002 Thomson Derwent. All rts. reserv.

012804267      \*\*Image available\*\*

WPI Acc No: 1999-610497/199952

XRPX Acc No: N99-449813

**Advertisement information access management method in internet**

Patent Assignee: AT & T CORP (AMTT )

Inventor: HANSON B L; HUBER K M

Number of Countries: 001    Number of Patents: 001

Patent Family:

Patent No	Kind	Date	Applicat No	Kind	Date	Week
US 5974398	A	19991026	US 97838863	A	19970411	199952 B

Priority Applications (No Type Date): US 97838863 A 19970411

Patent Details:

Patent No	Kind	Lan Pg	Main IPC	Filing Notes
US 5974398	A	25	G06F-017/60	

Abstract (Basic): US 5974398 A

NOVELTY - The computed bid values related to retained advertiser, are transmitted from network to user. The selected bid value corresponding to selected advertiser is received from user and advertising message related to selected advertiser is transmitted from network to user, for display. A **reward** corresponding to selected bid value is offered to user, based on the selected advertiser.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION - The advertiser's maximum and minimum bids for absentee bidding, are received at the network side. The user profile and two user characteristic specifications associated with respective advertiser, on the network are accessed. The user characteristics from the user profile is compared with that from advertiser specification. If one of two selected advertisers has a maximum bid less than the first **highest** maximum bid, the corresponding advertiser is dropped from bidding. If the selected advertiser has a maximum bid greater than the second **highest** minimum bid, then the corresponding advertiser is retained in the bidding. An INDEPENDENT CLAIM is also included for advertisement information access management system in internet.

USE - For access management of advertisement information for online, interactive information and entertainment services in network such as internet, telephone, cable television, direct television, satellite communication and radio frequency communication networks, and also for tennis bulletin board.

ADVANTAGE - The database uses customer interest profiles and online service usage data to identify particular user characteristic to advertisers. The advertiser can also interact directly with the online service platform, for e.g. by interacting with a human representative of the online service, or automatically using conventional automated response platforms. Enables usage of conventional procedures for storing and retrieving from databases. The value of the offer or bid **auctioned** to the user can be established based on the user's income or age.

DESCRIPTION OF DRAWING(S) - The figure shows the online advertising service in internet.

pp; 25 DwgNo 12/15

Title Terms: ADVERTISE; INFORMATION; ACCESS; MANAGEMENT; METHOD

Derwent Class: T01

International Patent Class (Main): G06F-017/60

File Segment: EPI

?

File 348:EUROPEAN PATENTS 1978-2002/Dec W02 .

(c) 2002 European Patent Office

File 349:PCT FULLTEXT 1979-2002/UB=20021219,UT=20021212

(c) 2002 WIPO/Univentio

?ds

Set	Items	Description
S1	2241	(AUCTION? OR DUTCHAUCTION? OR DUTCH()AUCTION? OR REVERSE()-AUCTION?) OR EBAY OR ONLINE()COM OR "ONLINE.COM"
S2	531	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (5N) (RULE? ? OR POLICY - OR POLICIES OR CONDITION? ? OR AGREEMENT? OR GUIDELINE? OR GUIDE()LINE? OR PARAMETER? OR REQUIREMENT? OR SPECS? OR SPECIFICATION? OR REGULATION? OR QUALIFICATION?)
S3	270	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (LEVEL OR LEVELS OR BEHAVIOR? OR BEHAVIOUR? OR SUBMISS?)
S4	758	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (HIGH? ? OR HIGHEST OR LOW? ? OR LOWEST OR COMPETITIVE? OR NON()COMPETITIVE?)
S5	442	S1(S) (S2 OR S3 OR S4)
S6	13	S5(S) (REWARD? OR PENALT?)

6/3,K/1 (Item 1 from file: 349)  
DIALOG(R)File 349:PCT FULLTEXT  
(c) 2002 WIPO/Univentio. All rts. reserv.

00943630 \*\*Image available\*\*

**NEGOTIATING PLATFORM**

**PLATE-FORME DE NEGOCIATION**

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Patent and Priority Information (Country, Number, Date):

Patent: WO 200277759 A2 20021003 (WO 0277759)

Application: WO 2002US8293 20020320 (PCT/WO US0208293)

Priority Application: US 2001276952 20010320; US 2001279422 20010329; US  
2001287004 20010430; US 2001305073 20010716; US 2001327291 20011009

Designated States: AE AG AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY BZ CA CH CN CO CR CU

CZ DE DK DM DZ EC EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP

KR KZ LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX MZ NO NZ OM PH PL PT RO

RU SD SE SG SI SK SL TJ TM TN TR TT TZ UA UG US UZ VN YU ZA ZM ZW

(EP) AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE TR

(OA) BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GQ GW ML MR NE SN TD TG

(AP) GH GM KE LS MW MZ SD SL SZ TZ UG ZM ZW

(EA) AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM

Publication Language: English

Filing Language: English

Fulltext Word Count: 91315

Fulltext Availability:

Claims

Claim

... the famous "Revenue Equivalence" theorem holds. This theorem states  
that WI auctions in which the **bidder** with the **highest** value wins, and  
the one with the lowest value loses and pays zero, are equivalent...

...s point of view. Note that the procedure we present below, which is a  
second price **auction** with a reservation price, does not belong to this  
class, and hence the Theorem is...

...to announce a positive reservation price which might result with  
no trade),

A second price **auction** with a reservation price: Price and Price-like  
Second price **auctions** are well known, The rules are as follows:

0 Seller chooses a reservation price  $r$ ...

...procedure is terminated with i) no trade. Otherwise,

0 The winner is the bidder whose **bid** was the **highest** (it

there is a tie -then the winner is chosen by a random device),  
0...

...the seller and the other buyers pay zero. Remarks.

1) At first blush, such an **auction** procedure looks inferior from a revenue point of view when compared, say, with the first-price **auction** (a similar procedure except that the winner pays his own price and not the second). However, such a naive view ignores the effect of the procedure's type on how **competitive** the **bidders** are.

2) An important advantage of this procedure is that it is very simple and transparent to follow. When the bidders and the **auctioneer** argue on the same variables a dominant strategy for a buyer is to bid his value...

...bidders may be concerned with different variables than those that are of interest to the **auctioneer**.

3) For a seller to choose a positive reservation price makes sense only if it...

...the seller's belief on how the buyers' values are distributed.

4) We described an **auction**. However, a similar description consider- Of course, the **lowest bidder** wins here and Max is replaced by Min

in determining the deal is actual price,

Multi-dimensional Second Price **Auction**

If the only detail yet to agree upon is price (or price-like), then all  
...

...in the utility layer, we shall treat both  $f$  and  $g(\cdot)$  as functions that map re-scribed **penalties**. That is, the lower it is for a party, the better is for that party...

...each party evaluates the deal according to his function (this provides a uniform treatment for **auctions**, **reverse auctions**, bartering **auctions** etc.). In such a case, it is important to first reveal the value function of the **auctioneer** to the bidders. One possibility is to reveal to the bidders the true value function, which was submitted by the **auctioneer**. Another possibility is to give the **auctioneer** an option to reveal a modified value function, denoted by  $g'(\cdot)$ , according to his strategic choice. Without loss of generality let  $g'(\cdot)$  be the disclosed value function. So, first the **auctioneer** reveals his value function  $g'(\cdot)$  (by publishing his GPA-- constraints, preferences and targets, arranged in K levels in lexicographical order) and then the bidders bid. Let the **auctioneer**'s reservation price is given in terms of ...the seller's targets) subject to his own constraints as well as those of the **auctioneer** (i.e., both OP, and GPA) and while not crossing the threshold values specified for...

...K

GP,

GPA

The first set of hard constraints forces the solution to meet the **bidder**'s threshold **specifications** (first) at each level of his objective function. The second set of constraints restricts the bid so that it gives the **auctioneer** at least what he announced as his threshold levels  $g^*_1, \dots, g^*_K$

.  $k, At \dots$

...the bidder tries to respond, as best as he can under the constraints. to the **auctioneer**'s objectives (according to their lexicographical order). The, **auctioneer** selects the winning bid as the one associated with the smallest value for  $g^*_0$ ...

...optimize his own objective function subject to the constraint that the selected values will give the **auctioneer** at least the utility obtained



...allows him to choose one of four approaches to determine whether to stay in the **auction** in light of the optimal valueftx \*) that was achieved as shown above.

1 The...

6/3,K/2 (Item 2 from file: 349)  
DIALOG(R)File 349:PCT FULLTEXT  
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00914809 \*\*Image available\*\*

**METHODS AND SYSTEMS FOR INTERACTIVE COLLECTION, EXCHANGE AND REDEMPTION OF POINTS**

**PROCEDES ET SYSTEMES INTERACTIFS DE COLLECTE, D'ECHANGE ET DE RESTITUTION DE POINTS CADEAUX**

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Legal Representative:

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Patent and Priority Information (Country, Number, Date):

Patent: WO 200248942 A1 20020620 (WO 0248942)

Application: WO 2001US48069 20011214 (PCT/WO US0148069)

Priority Application: US 2000737105 20001214

Designated States: AE AG AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY BZ CA CH CN CR CU CZ

DE DK DM DZ EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ

LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX MZ NO NZ PH PL PT RO RU SD SE

SG SI SK SL TJ TM TR TT TZ UA UG US UZ VN YU ZA ZW

(EP) AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE TR

(OA) BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GQ GW ML MR NE SN TD TG

(AP) GH GM KE LS MW MZ SD SL SZ TZ UG ZM ZW

(EA) AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM

Publication Language: English

Filing Language: English

Fulltext Word Count: 5410

Fulltext Availability:

Detailed Description

Detailed Description

... invention, depicted in Fig. 1, comprises a method for interactive collection, exchange and redemption of **reward** points relating to products or services. First, a user is identified (20). In one embodiment...

...to the user is then retrieved from a personal data store (22). A list of **reward** options is then presented to the user (24). Exemplary **reward** options may include merchandise (i.e., computers, software, PDA's, wireless phones, etc.) and experiences (i.e., travel, celebrity interactions, exclusive privileges, etc.). Potential **reward** options include a **reward** auction, in which the user can bid on a **reward** item with his/her **reward** points. The user's selection corresponding to the list of **reward** options is received (26). The user is then prompted to enter a bid value (28) corresponding to the selected **reward** option. The bid value is received from the user (30). In one embodiment, a check...

...cover the bid. After receiving the bid value, the bid value is compared against a **high bid** value to determine if the user's bid is greater than the **high bid** (31). If the user's bid value is not greater than the **high bid** value, the user is prompted to enter a **high bid** value (55). After the user's bid is received and determined to be greater than the **high bid**, a **bid fee** is deducted from the user's point balance (32). The bid fee ranges from...

...fee is a pre-determined number of points. At the pre-determined end of the **auction**, the user's bid is compared against any other bids to determine if the user...

...the bid value is deducted from the user's point balance (38) and the selected **reward** option is provided to the user (40). If the user did not win the **auction**, the user is returned to the list of selection options. In one embodiment, the user...

...the method of the present invention can be utilized with a wide variety of **auctions** such as reverse, Dutch, English and the like.

Preferably, the method comprises the ability to...

6/3,K/3 (Item 3 from file: 349)

DIALOG(R) File 349:PCT FULLTEXT

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00905169 \*\*Image available\*\*

#### METHOD OF PROVIDING ONLINE INCENTIVES

#### PROCEDE DE DISTRIBUTION D'INCITATIONS EN LIGNE

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Patent and Priority Information (Country, Number, Date):

Patent: WO 200239233 A2 20020516 (WO 0239233)

Application: WO 2001US50912 20011107 (PCT/WO US0150912)

Priority Application: US 2000711183 20001113

Designated States: AE AG AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY BZ CA CH CN CO CR CU

CZ DE DK DM DZ EC EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP

KR KZ LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX MZ NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD

SE SG SI SK SL TJ TM TR TT TZ UA UG UZ VN YU ZA ZW

(EP) AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE TR

(OA) BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GQ GW ML MR NE SN TD TG

(AP) GH GM KE LS MW MZ SD SL SZ TZ UG ZW

(EA) AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM

Publication Language: English

Filing Language: English

Fulltext Word Count: 6403

Fulltext Availability:

Detailed Description

Detailed Description

... retail price of the auction item or an unsuccessful bid, which is less than a **lowest** successful **bid** in the **auction**. The incentives may also be in the form of a coupon, discount, rebate, additional product,

reward , or any other type of offer.

For example, an e-mail entitled "Manager's Special...

6/3,K/4 (Item 4 from file: 349)  
DIALOG(R)File 349:PCT FULLTEXT  
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00898500

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR COMMUNICATING ADVERTISING AND ENTERTAINMENT CONTENT  
AND GATHERING CONSUMER INFORMATION

PROCEDE ET SYSTEME DE COMMUNICATION DE PUBLICITE ET DE CONTENU RECREATIF,  
ET DE COLLECTE D'INFORMATIONS CONSOMMATEURS

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Legal Representative:

HAWKINS Holmes J (agent), King & Spalding, 191 Peachtree Street, Atlanta,  
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Patent and Priority Information (Country, Number, Date):

Patent: WO 200231742 A2 20020418 (WO 0231742)

Application: WO 2001US9989 20010329 (PCT/WO US0109989)

Priority Application: US 2000239631 20001012

Designated States: AE AG AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY BZ CA CH CN CR CU CZ

DE DK DM DZ EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ

LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX MZ NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG

SI SK SL TJ TM TR TT TZ UA UG UZ VN YU ZA ZW

(EP) AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE TR

(OA) BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GW ML MR NE SN TD TG

(AP) GH GM KE LS MW MZ SD SL SZ TZ UG ZW

(EA) AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM

Publication Language: English

Filing Language: English

Fulltext Word Count: 13219

Fulltext Availability:

Detailed Description

Detailed Description

... the program's audience size (i.e., ratings), or may  
be priced based on an **auction** or bidding process, where theCRAV Ads are  
**rewarded** to the **highest bidder** . To establish pricing, the Promoters  
may  
analyze the existing program profitability based on standard production  
...

...higher cost-per-minute advertising fee,  
with the additional fee revenues helping to offsetCRAV Ad **reward** costs,  
CRAV Ad licensing and promotion costs, and Query 1820 response  
management process costs.  
When...

6/3,K/5 (Item 5 from file: 349)  
DIALOG(R)File 349:PCT FULLTEXT  
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00855132 \*\*Image available\*\*

MARKET SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PROMOTION OF INNOVATIONS TO EFFICIENT PUBLIC  
POLICY

SYSTEME DE MARCHE ET PROCEDE DE PROMOTION D'INNOVATION EN VUE DE MESURES  
POLITIQUES EFFICACES

Patent Applicant/Inventor:

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Patent and Priority Information (Country, Number, Date):  
Patent: WO 200188806 A1 20011122 (WO 0188806)  
Application: WO 2001US14465 20010505 (PCT/WO US0114465)  
Priority Application: US 2000565354 20000505  
Designated States: AE AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY CA CH CN CR CU CZ DE DK  
DM EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ LC LK LR  
LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG SI SK SL TJ  
TM TR TT TZ UA UG US UZ VN YU ZA ZW  
(EP) AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE TR  
(OA) BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GW ML MR NE SN TD TG  
(AP) GH GM KE LS MW MZ SD SL SZ TZ UG ZW  
(EA) AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM  
Publication Language: English  
Filing Language: English  
Fulltext Word Count: 10820  
  
Fulltext Availability:  
Detailed Description

#### Detailed Description

... low bidders for a House Seat for a policy.

5 To win the auction, the **bid** from the lowest **bidding** constituent must meet the following **conditions** : (1) it is in the **lowest** pool of **bids** in a politician's district or have combined with the **lowest bidder** , either voluntarily or through **penalties** ; (2) the **low bidder** 's politician must support the **policy** , (3) the public policy must be enacted and enforced, and (4) the **low bidders** representing politician must be in the smallest group of legislators necessary to pass the legislation, who represent the **lowest bidding** pool of **bidders** , including their combined and penalized bidders. Because a politician will probably not respond to a...

...avoid the penalties through joining special interest groups. A penalty is imposed on the pool of **lowest bidders** from the same district who fail to gain their legislator's support for their policy legislation, but from inferior **auctions** , for failing to gain the support of their politician for an efficient public policy. For example, the innovator will be able to penalize the **lowest bidder** if the **bidders** ' representing politician fails to support the policy in a committee vote. **Penalties** , combinations and the threat of future **penalties** should encourage urgency and hopefully encourage cooperation, while minimizing frivolous bids by those without political...from. a district who support candidates during primary and general elections and who are the **lowest bidders** in their district in their superior **auction** have the right to penalize the **lowest bidders** from the same district, but from inferior **auctions** , for failing to gain the support of the politician for an efficient public policy and the right to combine them with the next **lowest bidder** . For purposes of the present application, a **penalty** is defined as an action taken by the **lowest bidder** of a superior **auction** to reduce the **bid** of the **lowest bidder** in the next active inferior **auction** , when the **lowest bidder** fails to gain the support of the politician for the efficient public policy. For example...  
...contributors in a politician's district for a primary election will be able to penalize the **lowest bid** ders from the general primary election **auctions** for that district, if the elected politician fails to support the policy before committee votes...

...the fate of a bill) and before floor votes. In a similar example, 1) the **lowest bidders** in the primary level **auction** will be able to penalize and combine special interest groups, who are the **lowest**

**bidders** in the active general election level **auction** , 2) the **lowest bidders** in

-14~

the general election **auctions** will be able to penalize and combine special interest groups bidding in the committee and floor level **auctions** and 3) the innovators can penalize the **lowest bidding** lobbyist, if the innovator activates the lobbyist **auction** and primary election **auction low bidders** . These combinations are done with a formula that penalizes and adjusts for the number of...

...interest groups at a level are exhausted, or the politician commits support to the policy. **Penalties** , combinations and the threat of future **penalties** are intended to encourage competition, while minimizing frivolous bids by those without political influence. In...bidder in step 400 before repeating the process. If the lowest bidder in the superior **auction** 0 invokes a **penalty** at step 402, a **penalty** process is conducted in step 406 and the new **lowest** intradistrict **bid** is identified in steps 408 and 410. The new intradistrict **low bid** is published in step 412 before repeating the process. Now referring to FIG.

15, if...FIG. 22, if the politician commits to the proposed policy at step 612, only the **lowest** intradistrict **bidders** can **bid** up or down in step 614. Otherwise, if the **lowest bidder** in the superior **auction** invokes a warning at step 616, the **low bid** is published to intradistrict bidders and observers in step 620, and the interdistrict median bid is published in step 622. If the **lowest bidder** in the present **auction** combines with another bidder at step 624, that bidder joins that other bidder in step 626 before repeating the process. If the **lowest bidder** invokes a **penalty** at step 628, a **penalty** process is conducted in step 406 and the new **lowest** intradistrict **bid** is identified in steps 632 and 634. The new intradistrict **low bid** is published in step 636, and the new **low bid** and summed **bid** for the superior **auction** are calculated and published in step 638, before repeating the process. Now referring to FIG...the intent that they commit to supporting the public policy. In the inter-district sub- **auction** , there is competition between districts C'inter-district auction?'). The separate intra- and inter-district sub- **auctions** **reward** .

constituents with reimbursement to encourage political support and passage of the 5 innovator's efficient...

6/3,K/6 (Item 6 from file: 349)

DIALOG(R)File 349:PCT FULLTEXT

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00834218

**SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PRICING AND ALLOCATION OF COMMODITIES OR SECURITIES**  
**SYSTEME ET PROCEDE DE TARIFICATION ET D'ATTRIBUTION DE MARCHANDISES ET DE VALEURS**

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Patent and Priority Information (Country, Number, Date):

Patent: WO 200165908 A2 20010913 (WO 0165908)

Application: WO 2001US40236 20010302 (PCT/WO US0140236)

Priority Application: US 2000187800 20000308; US 2000668255 20000921

Designated States: AE AG AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY BZ CA CH CN CR CU CZ

DE DK DM DZ EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ

LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX MZ NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG

SI SK SL TJ TM TR TT TZ UA UG US UZ VN YU ZA ZW

(EP) AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE TR

(OA) BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GW ML MR NE SN TD TG

(AP) GH GM KE LS MW MZ SD SL SZ TZ UG ZW

(EA) AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM

Publication Language: English

Filing Language: English

Fulltext Word Count: 21565

Fulltext Availability:

Claims

Claim

... bid mechanism whereby bidders are rewarded for anonymously revealing their bids early comprises entering a **competitive bid** comprising a desired quantity of securities and two spreads over a benchmark treasury security.

1 5 26. An openbook system **auction** server node in accordance with claim

25 wherein the two spreads over a benchmark treasury...

6/3,K/7 (Item 7 from file: 349)

DIALOG(R)File 349:PCT FULLTEXT

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00833782 \*\*Image available\*\*

SYSTEM AND METHOD OF PROVIDING PROJECT COST EVALUATION

SYSTEME ET PROCEDE PERMETTANT D'EVALUER LE COUT D'UN PROJET

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Patent and Priority Information (Country, Number, Date):

Patent: WO 200167335 A1 20010913 (WO 0167335)

Application: WO 2000US42339 20001129 (PCT/WO US0042339)

Priority Application: US 2000521103 20000307

Designated States: AE AG AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY BZ CA CH CN CR CU CZ

DE DK DM DZ EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ

LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX MZ NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG

SI SK SL TJ TM TR TT TZ UA UG UZ VN YU ZA ZW

(EP) AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE TR

(OA) BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GW ML MR NE SN TD TG

(AP) GH GM KE LS MW MZ SD SL SZ TZ UG ZW

(EA) AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM

Publication Language: English

Filing Language: English

Fulltext Word Count: 8020

Fulltext Availability:  
Detailed Description

#### Detailed Description

... tracked may include discounts for bulk purchases based on purchase quantities or other incentive or **reward** programs. The costs may compensate for regional variations in the costs of material and labor. The costs may also factor in actual competitive vendor or service provider pricing or **bids**. These actual **competitive** pricing or **bids** may be retrieved by ...resources providing material, labor, and service pricing, such as online catalogs, web sites, and online **auctions**. The system 100 maintain and periodically update the vendor/service provider database of for rapid...

6/3,K/8 (Item 8 from file: 349)  
DIALOG(R)File 349:PCT FULLTEXT  
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00792486 \*\*Image available\*\*

#### METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR CONDUCTING AUCTIONS PROCEDE ET DISPOSITIF POUR LA CONDUITE D'ENCHERES

Patent Applicant/Inventor:

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Patent and Priority Information (Country, Number, Date):

Patent: WO 200125999 A1 20010412 (WO 0125999)

Application: WO 2000US27317 20001004 (PCT/WO US0027317)

Priority Application: US 99157433 19991004; US 99166477 19991119; US 99173956 19991230; US 2000221696 20000731

Designated States: AE AG AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY BZ CA CH CN CR CU CZ

DE DK DM DZ EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ

LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX MZ NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG

SI SK SL TJ TM TR TT TZ UA UG UZ VN YU ZA ZW

(EP) AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE

(OA) BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GW ML MR NE SN TD TG

(AP) GH GM KE LS MW MZ SD SL SZ TZ UG ZW

(EA) AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM

Publication Language: English

Filing Language: English

Fulltext Word Count: 12530

Fulltext Availability:  
Detailed Description

#### Detailed Description

... behavior" (i.e. bid early, bid high, quickly outbid those who outbid you) throughout the **auction**, by ensuring such behavior is **rewarded** throughout the **auction** process.

Additionally, some of the rewards mentioned are themselves innovative and would be new and...informed of the fact that the new high bidder is using proxy bidding. The previous **auction** leader may then choose to bid more than the minimum necessary under the point and **reward** system, to outbid the limit on the winner's proxy bidding. Alternatively, in addition to bidding the minimum necessary under the point and **reward** system, the previous **auction** leader can use his own

proxy bidding, in order to compete against the **high bidder** 's proxy **bidding** . Thus, whoever places the **highest bid** is permitted to acquire the item.

Multi-person

Further embodiments related to multi-person

bidding...in

quantity, rather than time of initial bid serving as a tiebreaker in quantity.

#### **Reverse Auction**

In a **reverse auction** , the **bidder** who places the **lowest bid** sells the item for that price or performs the service for that price, thus a lower bid is "worth" more than a higher **bid** . Some of the **rules** of the "point and **reward** " would have to be adjusted to be suitable for a **reverse auction** . For example, points are accorded for every second a **bidder** has the **lowest bid** , and for how much they decrement the **lowest bid** . If according points for the worth of a bid, a lower bid should be accorded...

...accomplish this is as follows. There is an initial maximum acceptable bid to begin the **auction** . The points accorded for a particular bid will be based on the value of the initial maximum bid minus the value of that particular bid. For example, if the **auction** begins at a maximum price of \$600, and someone bids \$550, he will receive 50 points for every second he maintains the **low bid** . If the minimum decrement is \$1 and someone lowers the bid from \$450 to \$447...

...predetermined weighing criteria established by the auction house, considering the non-monetary value of the **bid** criteria.

#### **Optional Rules**

The point and **reward** system turns the **auction** process into a sort of game, and therefore various elements from different games can be...

6/3,K/9 (Item 9 from file: 349)

DIALOG(R)File 349:PCT FULLTEXT

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00752886

#### **MORTGAGE AUCTION PROCESS MODEL**

#### **MODELE D'UN PROCESSUS D'ENCHERES HYPOTHECAIRES**

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Patent and Priority Information (Country, Number, Date):



Patent: WO 200065516 A2 20001102 (WO 0065516)  
Application: WO 2000US11897 20000428 (PCT/WO US0011897)  
Priority Application: US 99131360 19990428  
Designated States: AE AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY CA CH CN CR CU CZ DE DK  
DM EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ LC LK LR  
LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG SI SK SL TJ  
TM TR TT TZ UA UG US UZ VN YU ZA ZW  
(EP) AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE  
(OA) BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GW ML MR NE SN TD TG  
(AP) GH GM KE LS MW SD SL SZ TZ UG ZW  
(EA) AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM  
Publication Language: English  
Filing Language: English  
Fulltext Word Count: 20897

Fulltext Availability:  
Detailed Description

#### Detailed Description

... auction process routine 108 prompts the lender to determine if he wants to modify his **bidding guidelines** before participating in the secondary **auction**. For example, a lender that won several financially **rewarding** loans in the primary **auction** may choose to broaden his criteria to less financially **rewarding** loans during the secondary **auction**. If he opts not to modify his guideline, the "NO"

6/3,K/10 (Item 10 from file: 349)  
DIALOG(R)File 349:PCT FULLTEXT  
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00737987 \*\*Image available\*\*

#### GLOBALLY TIME-SYNCHRONIZED SYSTEMS, DEVICES AND METHODS SYSTEMES GLOBALEMENT SYNCHRONISES DANS LE TEMPS

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Patent and Priority Information (Country, Number, Date):

Patent: WO 200050974 A2-A3 20000831 (WO 0050974)

Application: WO 2000US5093 20000228 (PCT/WO US0005093)

Priority Application: US 99258573 19990226; US 2000513601 20000225

Parent Application/Grant:

Related by Continuation to: US Not furnished (CIP)

Designated States: AE AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY CA CH CN CR CU CZ DE DK  
DM EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ LC LK LR  
LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG SI SK SL TJ  
TM TR TT TZ UA UG US UZ VN YU ZA ZW  
(EP) AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE  
(OA) BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GW ML MR NE SN TD TG  
(AP) GH GM KE LS MW SD SL SZ TZ UG ZW  
(EA) AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM

Publication Language: English  
Filing Language: English  
Fulltext Word Count: 80968

Fulltext Availability:  
Claims

Claim

... process.

The high-level bidding process described above has been described in connection with an **auction** -supporting system having GSP-enabled client machines as shown in FIG. 2D. It is understood...

...such as those disclosed in Figs. 2DI through 2D5, can be used to practice the **auction** -supporting system and method of the present invention. Such modifications are described hereinabove in connection with the generic contest-promoting system of the present invention. In general, the **auction** -supporting system of the present invention can be used to **auction** off virtually any item of value such as, for example:  
antiques; commodities; consumer goods; personal...

...the electromagnetic spectrum, patents, etc.); transferable club memberships and subscriptions; and the like.

While the **auction** -supporting system of the present invention has been described above in connection with an Internet-based process involving many bidders simultaneously bidding on a single **auction** item, it

is understood that such bidders could be bidding on multiple items in a multi-item combinatorial **auctions**, as well as any variations thereof. In many applications, the bidders will be human beings and other forms of competitive behavior for recognition and/or **rewards** in accordance with the principles of the present invention.

It is also understood that the **auction** -supporting system of the present invention can be used to support many different types of **auction** -based processes including, for example, the sale of financial securities (e.g. stocks

Page 123...application of the present

Page 127 of 238

for all bidders participating in on-line **auctions**.

The system and methods of the present invention can also be applied to the filing...

...be physically or electronically situated.

In addition to the Internet-based game, securities trading, and **auction** processes described in detail above, the Internet-based competition and contest promoting systems and methods...

6/3,K/11 (Item 11 from file: 349)

DIALOG(R)File 349:PCT FULLTEXT

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00737980 \*\*Image available\*\*

COMPUTER SYSTEM AND METHODS FOR TRADING INFORMATION IN A NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT

SYSTEME ET PROCEDE INFORMATIQUES DESTINES AU COMMERCE DE L'INFORMATION DANS UN ENVIRONNEMENT RESEAU

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Patent and Priority Information (Country, Number, Date):  
Patent: WO 200050967 A2-A3 20000831 (WO 0050967)  
Application: WO 2000US4653 20000223 (PCT/WO US0004653)  
Priority Application: US 99256631 19990223  
Designated States: AU CA CN IL JP  
(EP) AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE  
Publication Language: English  
Filing Language: English  
Fulltext Word Count: 12758

Fulltext Availability:  
Claims

Claim

... MODIFY  
QUESTION SCREEN  
710  
705 ASK MODIFY  
if  
715-,... SPECIFY QUESTION MODIFY  
ATTRIBUTES ATTRIBUTES  
AND **BIDDING**  
**RULE**  
DEDUCT QUESTION  
POINT WORTH FROM  
720 USER'S ACCOUNT 755  
725 SEARCH EXISTING  
DATABAS E...  
...736 735  
YES I HING  
DISTRIBUTE OSEN AS A  
POINTS SWER?  
740  
ADJUST  
RATING SPECIFY **BID** **RULE**  
737 750  
ADJUST POST QUESTION TO  
ANSWER LIST- ALL RELEVANT USERS  
ONLY SELECTED  
ANSWERS  
FlGe7  
738  
SUBSTITUTE SHEET.( **RULE** 26)  
/24  
CURRENT 780  
**BID** PRICE  
SPECIFY @@781  
INCREMENT  
MAX VALUE  
SPECIFY @@782  
TIME TO  
INCREMENT  
INCREMENT  
BID -%,@,@783  
PRICE...  
...WITH  
QUESTIONS IN 1005  
SELECTED AREA  
ADJUST RATING 1 006  
T@@.  
ADJUST USER 1007  
PROFILE  
**REWARD**

POINTS IF 1 008  
APPLICABLE  
1009  
RESULTS  
FlGo 1 0  
SUBSTITUTE SHEET (RULE 26)  
/24...

6/3,K/12 (Item 12 from file: 349)  
DIALOG(R)File 349:PCT FULLTEXT  
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00577735 \*\*Image available\*\*

**SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR ENCOURAGING COMPETITIVE PARTICIPATION IN AN AUCTION  
SYSTEME ET PROCEDE POUR ENCOURAGER LA PARTICIPATION CONCURRENTIELLE A UNE  
VENTE AUX ENCHERES**

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VAN LUCHENE Andrew S,  
TEDESCO Daniel E,

Inventor(s):

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TEDESCO Daniel E,

Patent and Priority Information (Country, Number, Date):

Patent: WO 200041108 A1 20000713 (WO 0041108)  
Application: WO 99US23901 19991014 (PCT/WO US9923901)  
Priority Application: US 98223901 19981231

Designated States: AE AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY CA CH CN CU CZ DE DK EE  
ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ LC LK LR LS LT  
LU LV MD MG MK MN MW MX NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG SI SK SL TJ TM TR TT  
UA UG US UZ VN YU ZA ZW GH GM KE LS MW SD SL SZ TZ UG ZW AM AZ BY KG KZ  
MD RU TJ TM AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE BF BJ  
CF CG CI CM GA GN GW ML MR NE SN TD TG

Publication Language: English

Fulltext Word Count: 11034

Fulltext Availability:

Detailed Description  
Claims

English Abstract

In both an on-line and a conventional **auction**, an **auctioneer** may encourage **competitive bidding behavior** through the provision of **rewards** to those bidders whose bids meet predetermined criteria. For example, a bidder may be **rewarded** if her bid exceeds a prior bid by a threshold value. An **auctioneer** may further discourage **non-competitive bidding behavior** by penalizing those **bidders** whose bids fall below predetermined standards.

Detailed Description

... relates to auctions, and relates more particularly to systems and methods for rewarding or penalizing **bidders** whose **bidding behavior** during an **auction** session meets predetermined standards.

Background of the Invention

Auctioning has been an accepted method for...

...for the product from a bidder during the auction session; determining, based on a reward **rule**, whether the **bidder** is qualified to receive a **reward**; and if the bidder is qualified, transmitting, to the bidder, an indication that the bidder is qualified to receive the **reward**.

According to a second aspect of the present invention, a system and

While the...

...on-line embodiment, are equally applicable to enhance competitive bidding in any conventional form of **auctioning**. Furthermore, the databases and data stored therein may be rearranged or combined into equivalent structures. Finally, it is to be understood that a **reward** may be provided during a current **auction** or may be awarded subsequent to the current **auction**. Accordingly, it is to be understood that the foregoing description is provided for illustrative purposes...

#### Claim

... the product from a bidder during the auction session; determining, based on a reward **rule**, whether the **bidder** is qualified to receive a **reward**, and if the bidder is qualified: transmitting, to the bidder, an indication that the bidder is qualified to receive the **reward**.

2 The method of claim 1, further comprising:  
determining, based on the bid, whether the...NO  
0 MAKE BID?

01

RE PENALTY

BID >CURR T NO ASSESSED

Hi BI AGAINST

**BIDDER**

1021

IDENTIFY CORRESPONDING **REWARD**

**RULES** IN **REWARD** RULES DATABASE ALONG

WITH TIME/DATE RECEIVED 1022

PROVIDE YES R CE VED BID ALIFY NO

**REWARD** SECOND BIDDER

1026 FOR **REWARD** ?

FIG, 10B

INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT Interim MAplicationmo

PCT/US 99/23901

A. CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJECT...v of tw felftarit Panag" Relevant to dalm  
No.

A KUMAR M ET AL,: "Internet **AUCtions** " L50954,

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD USENIX WORKSHOP ON 59-66

ELECTRONIC COMMERCEt

31 August 1998...

6/3,K/13 (Item 13 from file: 349)

DIALOG(R)File 349:PCT FULLTEXT

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00545205 \*\*Image available\*\*

**A METHOD AND AN APPARATUS FOR A UNIVERSAL TRADING MARKET DESIGN AND  
DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM**

**PROCEDE ET APPAREIL RELATIFS A UN SYSTEME UNIVERSEL DE CONCEPTION ET DE  
MISE EN OEUVRE DE MARCHES D'ECHANGES**

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EPHRATI Eithan,

Inventor(s):

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WELLMAN Michael,

EPHRATI Eithan,

Patent and Priority Information (Country, Number, Date):

Patent: WO 200008578 A1 20000217 (WO 0008578)

Application: WO 99US17248 19990729 (PCT/WO US9917248)

Priority Application: US 98131048 19980807; US 99339325 19990623  
Designated States: AE AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY CA CH CN CU CZ DE DK EE  
ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ LC LK LR LS LT  
LU LV MD MG MK MN MW MX NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG SI SK SL TJ TM TR TT  
UA UG US UZ VN YU ZA ZW GH GM KE LS MW SD SL SZ UG ZW AM AZ BY KG KZ MD  
RU TJ TM AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE BF BJ CF  
CG CI CM GA GN GW ML MR NE SN TD TG  
Publication Language: English  
Fulltext Word Count: 8012

Fulltext Availability:  
Detailed Description

#### Detailed Description

... case for restrictions referred to as activity rules that are common in complex auction scenarios.

**Bidding rules** may also involve payments, such as a fee paid in order to allow a participant...

...fee (refundable or not refundable), or withdrawals may be allowed on payment of a decommitment **penalty**. The foregoing represents a portion of **bidding rules** that may be used in an **auction**. By executing of **bidding rules** such as those presented above, a "bid state" is created. A "bid state" is the...

?ds

Set	Items	Description
S1	628	(AUCTION? OR DUTCHAUCTION? OR DUTCH()AUCTION? OR REVERSE()- AUCTION?) OR EBAY OR ONLINE()COM OR "ONLINE.COM"
S2	20	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (5N) (RULE? ? OR POLICY - OR POLICIES OR CONDITION? ? OR AGREEMENT? OR GUIDELINE? OR GU- IDE()LINE? OR PARAMETER? OR REQUIREMENT? OR SPECS? OR SPECIFI- CATION? OR REGULATION? OR QUALIFICATION?)
S3	4	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (LEVEL OR LEVELS OR BEHAVIOR? OR BEHAVIOUR? OR SUBMISS?)
S4	37	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (HIGH? ? OR HIGHEST OR LOW? ? OR LOWEST OR COMPETITIVE? OR NON()COMPETITIVE?)
S5	28	S1 AND (S2 OR S3 OR S4)
S6	0	S5 AND (REWARD? OR PENALT?)
S7	13	S5 NOT PY>1999

7/5/1

DIALOG(R)File 256:SoftBase:Reviews,Companies&Prods.  
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01788473 DOCUMENT TYPE: Product

**PRODUCT NAME:** AuctionBuilder 1.0 (788473)

Able Solutions Corp (652857)  
5139 NE 94th Ave  
Vancouver, WA 98662 United States  
TELEPHONE: (360) 253-4142

RECORD TYPE: Directory

CONTACT: Sales Department

**AuctionBuilder** 1.0 from Able Solutions/AbleCommerce is a browser-based toolkit for setting up and running online **auctions** . It builds user-friendly, efficient Web sites that can offer many sophisticated features. Developers can quickly deploy **auction** sites for charity, business to business (B2B), and business to consumer (B2C) applications. **AuctionBuilder** -built **auctions** can use **high bid** , Vickery, Classic Dutch, or Modern Dutch styles. The system offers many browser-based tools for administrators that can simply **auction** setup and maintenance. Administrators can schedule **auctions** , monitor sales from any location, approve **auctions** , or generate financial reports. For end-users, **AuctionBuilder** offers the abilities to view **bid** histories, to retract a **bid** , or to have the system **bid** automatically under user-defined **conditions** . The system also offers **bidders** secure, encrypted payment processing.

DESCRIPTORS: **Auctions** ; E-Commerce; Authoring Systems; Extranets;  
Internet Marketing; Sales Force Automation; Program Development

HARDWARE: Hardware Independent  
OPERATING SYSTEM: Open Systems  
PROGRAM LANGUAGES: Proprietary Languages  
TYPE OF PRODUCT: Micro  
POTENTIAL USERS: Cross Industry, Auction Site Startups & Owners  
PRICE: Available upon request

REVISION DATE: 020101

7/5/2

DIALOG(R)File 256:SoftBase:Reviews,Companies&Prods.  
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01776157 DOCUMENT TYPE: Product

**PRODUCT NAME:** TD- Auction (776157)

Ariba Inc (635961)  
807 11th Ave  
Sunnyvale, CA 94089 United States  
TELEPHONE: (650) 390-1000

RECORD TYPE: Directory

CONTACT: Sales Department

Ariba's TD- **Auction** (TM) is an Internet **auction** system originally created by TradingDynamics. TD- **Auction** helps companies reduce the cost of selling goods and lower their inventory costs. Web **auctions** can liquidate



excess inventory. TD- **Auction** enables **auction** sponsors to control the **rules** of **auctions** . It supports anonymous **bidding** , invitation-only **auctions** , and customer segmentation (e.g., preferred bidders). TD- **Auction** users can utilize **auctions** to increase competition among potential buyers. The system can complement existing sales and distribution channels.  
DESCRIPTORS: **Auctions** ; E-Commerce; Internet Marketing; Retailers; Sales Force Automation; Wholesalers; Extranets

HARDWARE: Hardware Independent; Java  
OPERATING SYSTEM: Open Systems; Java  
PROGRAM LANGUAGES: Java  
TYPE OF PRODUCT: Mainframe; Mini; Micro; Workstation  
POTENTIAL USERS: E-Commerce, Extranets, Web Auctions, Service Providers, Manufacturers  
PRICE: Available upon request

REVISION DATE: 020101

7/5/3

DIALOG(R)File 256:SoftBase:Reviews,Companies&Prods.  
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01091146 DOCUMENT TYPE: Product

**PRODUCT NAME: PeopleSoft Strategic Sourcing 8 (091146)**

PeopleSoft Inc (484521)  
4460 Hacienda Dr  
Pleasanton, CA 94588-8618 United States  
TELEPHONE: (925) 225-3000

RECORD TYPE: Directory

CONTACT: Sales Department

PeopleSoft's PeopleSoft (R) 8 Strategic Sourcing, part of the Supply Chain Management product line, allows businesses to streamline request for quote, request for proposal, and other sourcing tasks. It can also be tapped in conducting real-time **auctions** , awarding contracts, and handling purchase orders. PeopleSoft 8 Strategic Sourcing supports **competitive bidding** , allowing businesses to reduce procurement costs. The system also lets procurement managers align purchasing objectives with overall business strategies. The product can track bidder participation and results. PeopleSoft Strategic Sourcing also saves procurement data, allowing companies to reuse sourcing strategies. Information can also be referenced in performance analyses. A demonstration version of PeopleSoft Strategic Sourcing can be accessed through the PeopleSoft Web site.

DESCRIPTORS: **Auctions** ; E-Purchasing; Purchase Orders; Purchasing

HARDWARE: Hardware Independent  
OPERATING SYSTEM: Open Systems  
PROGRAM LANGUAGES: Not Available  
TYPE OF PRODUCT: Mainframe; Mini; Micro; Workstation  
POTENTIAL USERS: Cross Industry, Purchasing  
PRICE: Available upon request; Internet demo available

REVISION DATE: 021203

7/5/4

DIALOG(R)File 256:SoftBase:Reviews,Companies&Prods.  
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01012891 DOCUMENT TYPE: Product

**PRODUCT NAME:** Auction (012891

Dynacomp Inc (095443)  
4560 E Lake Rd  
Livonia, NY 14487 United States  
TELEPHONE: (585) 346-9788

RECORD TYPE: Directory

CONTACT: Sales Department

**Auction** is a program designed to help record, organize and analyze **auction** bids. Each lot is identified by a lot number, description and catalog value. The bidder information includes a bidder number, name, address, and date of bid. The bid information is entered as bidder number, lot number, and bid. The program identifies the **highest bidder** (and the next two highest), lot by lot, and shows summaries (lot number, bid, and total) for each bidder. Results may be displayed on the screen or printed.  
DESCRIPTORS: Bid Preparation; Wholesalers; Sales Force Automation

HARDWARE: Apple II  
OPERATING SYSTEM: ProDOS  
PROGRAM LANGUAGES: Not Available  
TYPE OF PRODUCT: Micro  
PRICE: \$69.95

DOCUMENTATION AVAILABLE: User manuals  
TRAINING AVAILABLE: Telephone support; technical support  
REVISION DATE: 960910

7/5/5

DIALOG(R) File 256:SoftBase:Reviews,Companies&Prods.  
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00120125 DOCUMENT TYPE: Review

**PRODUCT NAMES:** Auctions (840581

**TITLE:** The Corporate Flea Market  
**AUTHOR:** Hapgood, Fred  
**SOURCE:** Inc., v21 n13 p90(6) Sep 14, 1999  
**ISSN:** 0162-8968  
**HOME PAGE:** <http://www.inc.com>

RECORD TYPE: Review  
REVIEW TYPE: Product Analysis  
GRADE: Product Analysis, No Rating

A discussion of the advantages to small businesses that are possible with Internet-conducted business-to-business (B-to-B) **auctions** explains that B-to-B **auctions** are very different from the consumer variety. For instance, in B-to-B **auctions**, sellers and purchasers deal in such items as bulldozers, huge rolls of bubble wrap, industrial process control software, huge conference tables, and employees. Recently, **eBay** listed an Internet service provider's (ISP's) complete engineering staff, all of whom could be sold to the **highest bidder**, who, however, had to employ them in the Silicon Valley. B-to-B **auctions** dominate the online **auction** market, and one analysis firm forecasts that the value of goods and services sold in online B-to-B **auctions** will soon exceed the value of those sold in consumer **auctions** by sixfold. The market should be worth \$50 billion by 2002. The popularity of B-to-B **auctions** arises from companies' need to profitably sell off inventory and supplies taking up

space in all types of storage areas, from closets to warehouses. The items include out-of-date equipment, factory seconds, discontinued or repackaged models, and used, liquidated, rebuilt, or spruced-up items. Companies know they can get much more for these items from people who want or need them than from liquidators. Online **auctions** provide a fast easy way to unload these items and can also provide more opportunities for promotion and publicity.

COMPANY NAME: Vendor Independent (999999)  
SPECIAL FEATURE: Charts  
DESCRIPTORS: **Auctions** ; E-Commerce; Internet Shopping; Purchasing; Small Business  
REVISION DATE: 20010330

7/5/6

DIALOG(R)File 256:SoftBase:Reviews,Companies&Prods.  
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00118842 DOCUMENT TYPE: Review

PRODUCT NAMES: **Free Trade Zone** (769011)

TITLE: **Electronic Procurement**  
AUTHOR: Wilson, Tim  
SOURCE: Information Week, v748 p68(2) Aug 16, 1999  
ISSN: 8750-6874  
HOMEPAGE: <http://www.informationweek.com>

RECORD TYPE: Review  
REVIEW TYPE: Product Analysis  
GRADE: Product Analysis, No Rating

IBM/Part Miner's Free Trade Zone, a new electronic procurement service, assists electronics companies in finding and purchasing supplies more easily and at less expense. Free Trade Zone combines an electronic marketplace, content aggregation site, and hosted application service. It should be available by the end of 1999, says a spokesperson for PartMiner, a spot-marketing company that uses data mining technology to find rare electronic components, and then brokers them to manufacturers. Users of a beta Free Trade Zone site report more efficiency, especially in the time required to find parts or equivalent substitutions. The process of obtaining spec sheets, verifying information, and placing an order used to take two weeks, but not requires only a few minutes. Access for buyers and suppliers is via Web browsers and a hosted application service. Buyers can post requests for quotes on components, and then **'reverse - auction'** them to find the **lowest bidders**. Free Trade Zone also provides a bill-of-materials system with which customers can negotiate prices, generate purchase orders, and exchange invoice data. Customers and suppliers pay nothing for Free Trade Zone, and PartMiner has obtained \$20 million in venture capital to fund the site for its spot-marketing service. If **reverse auctions** do not find enough suppliers, PartMiner will offer to find missing parts and mediate a deal to deliver them.

COMPANY NAME: IBM Corp (351245)  
SPECIAL FEATURE: Tables  
DESCRIPTORS: Data Mining; E-Commerce; E-Purchasing; Internet Marketing; Manufacturing; Part Ordering  
REVISION DATE: 20010330

7/5/7

DIALOG(R)File 256:SoftBase:Reviews,Companies&Prods.  
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00118386

DOCUMENT TYPE: Review

PRODUCT NAMES: Auctions (840581); Internet Marketing (835552)

TITLE: The New Deal: Online auctions deliver good fun and good buys...

AUTHOR: Peterson, Tami D

SOURCE: Computer Shopper, v19 n6 p106(2) Jun 1999

ISSN: 0886-0556

HOME PAGE: <http://www.computershopper.com>

RECORD TYPE: Review

REVIEW TYPE: Product Analysis

GRADE: Product Analysis, No Rating

A discussion of online **auctions** emphasizes their potential for fun and good values, as long as attendees keep good sense. They should keep in mind that 'online **auctioneers** play by their own rules. And for some that means there aren't any.' For instance, a top-10 list of frequently reported Internet frauds puts incidents related to Web **auctions** at the top of the list. Online **auction** shoppers should read notices of sites' policies and rules of participation, which are generally posted on the sites. These disclosures often are worded to limit the liability of the **auction** regarding function or fit of products sold. Such **conditions** do not leave successful **bidders** with much recourse if they are disappointed. Buyers also should not expect a warranty unless one is stipulated, and they should make every attempt to verify **condition** or content of products before **bidding**. Several sites provide technical support services for this purpose in advance of the start of bidding. Users who follow this advice and stick to a common sense approach throughout can get bargains at online **auctions**. Among many other factors, bidders should keep in mind what other bidders may be willing to pay, and this ability involves strategies that are hard to define. Some bidders only bid at the last minute, while others start early and guard their positions. One consumer says he 'consistently see(s) items go for more than their retail price,' but when certain precautions are observed, this does not have to happen.

COMPANY NAME: Vendor Independent (999999)

SPECIAL FEATURE: Charts

DESCRIPTORS: **Auctions**; Internet Marketing; Internet Shopping

REVISION DATE: 20010331

7/5/8

DIALOG(R) File 256:SoftBase:Reviews,Companies&Prods.

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00117467

DOCUMENT TYPE: Review

PRODUCT NAMES: Auctions (840581); E-Commerce (836109)

TITLE: Online Auction Action

AUTHOR: Methvin, David W

SOURCE: Windows Magazine, v10 n6 p159(2) Jun 1999

ISSN: 1060-1066

HOME PAGE: <http://www.winmag.com>

RECORD TYPE: Review

REVIEW TYPE: Product Analysis

GRADE: Product Analysis, No Rating

A discussion of online **auctions** that cater to the needs of businesses emphasizes that business **auctions** are useful not just for new equipment purchasing, but also for locating spare parts for older or rare equipment. Companies can **auction** off excess or older computer equipment to the **highest bidder** from Auction IT, a site that has over 175 dealers who

participate in **auctions** . **Auction** listings are available only to registered bidders, which means that **auction** participants, unless registered bidders, cannot look at current listings to appraise the value of items before they are **auctioned** . United Computer Exchange also focuses on **auctioning** of computer equipment, and has an excellent search engine that allows users to find equipment according to platform. **Auction** Watchers is an **auction** search site that allows prospective purchasers to use such categories as servers, network hardware, and other components to check out various **auction** sites. When participating in an **auction** , users should be careful of listings that provide little detail about a product, and should consider using escrow services such as i-Escrow, SecureTrades.com, or TradeSafe Online. They ensure that buyer, seller, and **auctioneer** are satisfied with a transaction. If a company's older PC equipment is difficult to sell on an **auction** site, the company should consider donating it. A donation makes the company eligible for a tax deduction for the fair market value of the goods and builds respect for the company in the community.

COMPANY NAME: Vendor Independent (999999)  
SPECIAL FEATURE: Screen Layouts  
DESCRIPTORS: **Auctions** ; E-Commerce; Internet Marketing; Part Ordering;  
Purchasing  
REVISION DATE: 20010330

7/5/9

DIALOG(R)File 256:SoftBase:Reviews,Companies&Prods.  
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00115658 DOCUMENT TYPE: Review

PRODUCT NAMES: **OpenSite Auction 4.0** (704733

TITLE: **OpenSite is high bidder on Web auctioning**  
AUTHOR: Rapoza, Jim  
SOURCE: PC Week, v16 n12 p35(2) Mar 22, 1999  
ISSN: 0740-1604

RECORD TYPE: Review  
REVIEW TYPE: Review  
GRADE: A

**OpenSite Auction 4.0** from **OpenSite Technologies** is a top-choice World Wide Web **auction** solution that offers powerful and flexible bid models that cater to any **auctioning** style, though the high package prices and complicated administration tasks are weaknesses. Established **auction** Web sites will appreciate **OpenSite's** adherence to standard Web technologies and protocols when migrating to the platform, and though **Auction** is not cheap at \$5,000, it provides many advantages over far more expensive competing developer services and proprietary systems. The program, which was awarded this magazine's top choice award, offers great flexibility and easily provides tools for users to create centralized **auction** house processes. One weakness is that **Auction** requires a fair amount of Web site authoring skills and at least a modicum of **auction** -hosting business models.

PRICE: \$5000

COMPANY NAME: Siebel Systems Inc (608246)  
SPECIAL FEATURE: Screen Layouts  
DESCRIPTORS: **Auctions** ; IBM PC & Compatibles; Internet Marketing;  
Internet Shopping; Sales Force Automation; Wholesalers  
REVISION DATE: 20020124

7/5/10

DIALOG(R) File 256:SoftBase:Reviews,Companies&Prods.  
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00115558 DOCUMENT TYPE: Review

**PRODUCT NAMES:** eBay (736414); ONSALE (683434); WebCharity (743691);  
FirstAuction (743704); Online Dutch Auction (743712)

**TITLE:** Going Once...Going Twice... Cybersold!  
**AUTHOR:** Manjourides, Carolyn  
**SOURCE:** Link-Up, v16 n2 p22(1) Mar/Apr 1999  
**ISSN:** 0734-988X  
**HOME PAGE:** <http://www.infotoday.com>

**RECORD TYPE:** Review  
**REVIEW TYPE:** Product Analysis  
**GRADE:** Product Analysis, No Rating

A discussion of online **auctions** highlights many **auction** sites on the Web, including those selling general merchandise and those that fund charities. One site owner states that surfers who attend online **auctions** are attracted to and looking for bargains. Business-to-business **auctions** are large revenue producers, and allow companies with an oversupply of industrial commodities or companies needing, for example, many cheap computers quickly to respectively unload their inventory and obtain what they need. Many computer and consumer electronics products are sold at online **auctions**, and at **eBay**, users can trade 24 hours a day. About 1.3 million users have registered with **eBay**, which has more than a million items for sale. GivetoCharity is a worldwide, secure online donation service for nonprofit organizations, and promotes easy access for those who wish to donate online to a favorite charity. WebCharity's goal is to assist charities in profiting from the quickly expanding popularity of Internet **auctions** and the expansiveness of World Wide Web philanthropists. Internet **auctions** can last anywhere from an hour to a week, and have differing formats. For instance, Klik-Klok's Online **Dutch Auction** offers items at a high price while the clock ticks and the items' prices drop until someone buys something. Yankee **auctions** are more common: a few identical items at a high price are offered for sale concurrently, and the **highest bidders** get the goods at the close of the **auction**.

**COMPANY NAME:** eBay Inc (658545); egghead.com Superstores (639397);  
WebCharity.com LLC (660698); Internet Shopping Network Inc (660701);  
Klik-Klok Productions LLC (660671)  
**DESCRIPTORS:** **Auctions**; Internet Marketing; Internet Shopping; Purchasing  
**REVISION DATE:** 20010331

7/5/11

DIALOG(R) File 256:SoftBase:Reviews,Companies&Prods.  
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00108759 DOCUMENT TYPE: Review

**PRODUCT NAMES:** OpenSite Auction (704733)

**TITLE:** Extranet Auctions Help Companies Manage Inventory  
**AUTHOR:** Murphy, Kathleen  
**SOURCE:** Internet World, v4 n21 p13(2) Jun 8, 1998  
**ISSN:** 1097-8291  
**HOME PAGE:** <http://www.iw.com>

**RECORD TYPE:** Review  
**REVIEW TYPE:** Product Analysis  
**GRADE:** Product Analysis, No Rating

OpenSite Technologies' OpenSite **Auction** is highlighted in a discussion of extranet **auctions** , which are beginning to provide companies with the opportunity to move billions of dollars in first-run and excess goods to registered users who bid for all types of products, including computers and ad time, as well as oil and gas. Online, business-to-business **auctions** should exceed \$5.2 billion in sales in 1998, and will go over \$7.3 billion in 1999, says a report from a research firm. Extranet **auctions** represent a large part of all revenue expended in online **auctions** , which should reach \$52.6 billion by 2002, says the analysis firm. Companies selling **auction** software, including Moai Technologies, are targeting computer and semiconductor industries because quickly moving product cycles can cause inventory management problems. The **auction** market is also reaching commodity industries such as oil and gas. Ingram Micro, a computer distributor, has the **Auction** Block Site that allows resellers to bid on excess inventory that cannot be returned to manufacturers. Media **Auction** , an online seller of broadcast advertising time, uses OpenSite **Auction** software from OpenSite Technologies to allow advertisers to get bargains from last minute **agreements** in **bidding** for unsold media time on networks and stations across the U.S.

COMPANY NAME: Siebel Systems Inc (608246)  
SPECIAL FEATURE: Graphs  
DESCRIPTORS: Extranets; Internet Marketing; Sales Force Automation;  
Wholesalers  
REVISION DATE: 20020124

7/5/12

DIALOG(R) File 256:SoftBase:Reviews,Companies&Prods.  
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00098068 DOCUMENT TYPE: Review

PRODUCT NAMES: Internet Marketing (835552)

TITLE: Online auctions : Bid adieu to high prices  
AUTHOR: Tamosaitis, Nancy  
SOURCE: HomePC, v4 n2 p141(4) Feb 1997  
ISSN: 1073-1784

RECORD TYPE: Review  
REVIEW TYPE: Product Analysis  
GRADE: Product Analysis, No Rating

Online **auctions** held on the World Wide Web can help home computer users find the components they want conveniently and at the price they want to pay. For example, one user obtained a DeskJet 850C at about 25 percent off the best price found in stores, after bidding in advance and providing a credit card number to an **auction** 'house' on the Web. Many cost-conscious shoppers use online **auctions** to shop for other items as well, including antiques, art, computers, rare coins, real estate, vacation packages, wines, and other products. They can purchase goods at below market prices from home, while enjoying access to sales all over the world. **Auction** sites generally show items with a description, minimum bid, and final date for all bids. The bid is made in an e-mail message to the seller, or users send in an electronic bid form with the price the bidder is willing to pay on the form. Some sites hold live **auctions** at which users bid in real-time against other bidders on the Internet for each item that goes under the hammer. Reverse and sealed **auctions** are also discussed. Most online **auctions** do not list maximum bids, so users do not know if their bid is the best offer. Some sites have an immediate response feature that tells the bidder if his or her **bid** is the **highest** current **bid** .

COMPANY NAME: Vendor Independent (999999)  
SPECIAL FEATURE: Charts Screen Layouts

DESCRIPTORS: Computer Equipment; Internet Marketing; Wholesalers  
REVISION DATE: 20010330

7/5/13

DIALOG(R)File 256:SoftBase:Reviews,Companies&Prods.  
(c)2002 Info.Sources Inc. All rts. reserv.

00095479 DOCUMENT TYPE: Review

PRODUCT NAMES: Internet (833029)

TITLE: Dueling for domains

AUTHOR: Nash, Kim S

SOURCE: Computerworld, v30 n40 p61(2) Sep 30, 1996

ISSN: 0010-4841

HOME PAGE: <http://www.computerworld.com>

RECORD TYPE: Review

REVIEW TYPE: Product Analysis

GRADE: Product Analysis, No Rating

Some speculators have been registering Internet domain names for subsequent **auction** to the **highest bidder**. Network Solutions, the agency that oversees domain name registration, will no longer mediate domain name disputes, and will not be held responsible if a domain name infringes on an existing trademark. Brokers have emerged that buy and sell Web names. Regardless of whether a registrant intends to use a domain name or sell it, the registrant still must comply with Network Solutions' rules and legal restrictions against trademark infringement.

COMPANY NAME: Vendor Independent (999999)

DESCRIPTORS: Internet; Internet Marketing; Legal; Trademarks

REVISION DATE: 20020819

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File 2:INSPEC 1969-2002/Dec W3  
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(c) 2002 The HW Wilson Co.  
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(c) 2002 Info. Today Inc.  
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File 474:New York Times Abs 1969-2002/Dec 19  
(c) 2002 The New York Times  
File 475:Wall Street Journal Abs 1973-2002/Dec 19  
(c) 2002 The New York Times

?ds

Set	Items	Description
S1	24041	(AUCTION? OR DUTCHAUCTION? OR DUTCH()AUCTION? OR REVERSE()-AUCTION?) OR EBAY OR ONLINE()COM OR "ONLINE.COM"
S2	2505	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (5N) (RULE? ? OR POLICY -OR POLICIES OR CONDITION? ? OR AGREEMENT? OR GUIDELINE? OR GUIDE()LINE? OR PARAMETER? OR REQUIREMENT? OR SPECS? OR SPECIFICATION? OR REGULATION? OR QUALIFICATION?)
S3	501	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (LEVEL OR LEVELS OR BEHAVIOR? OR BEHAVIOUR? OR SUBMISS?)
S4	5631	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (HIGH? ? OR HIGHEST OR LOW? ? OR LOWEST OR COMPETITIVE? OR NON()COMPETITIVE?)
S5	832	S1 AND (S2 OR S3 OR S4)
S6	6	S5 AND (REWARD? OR PENALT?)
S7	6	RD (unique items)

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S3	501	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (LEVEL OR LEVELS OR BEHAVIOR? OR BEHAVIOUR? OR SUBMISS?)
S4	5631	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (HIGH? ? OR HIGHEST OR LOW? ? OR LOWEST OR COMPETITIVE? OR NON()COMPETITIVE?)
S5	832	S1 AND (S2 OR S3 OR S4)
S6	6	S5 AND (REWARD? OR PENALT?)
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File 233:Internet & Personal Comp. Abs. 1981-2002/Dec  
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File 474:New York Times Abs 1969-2002/Dec 19  
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S2	2505	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (5N) (RULE? ? OR POLICY -OR POLICIES OR CONDITION? ? OR AGREEMENT? OR GUIDELINE? OR GUIDE()LINE? OR PARAMETER? OR REQUIREMENT? OR SPECS? OR SPECIFICATION? OR REGULATION? OR QUALIFICATION?)
S3	501	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (LEVEL OR LEVELS OR BEHAVIOR? OR BEHAVIOUR? OR SUBMISS?)
S4	5631	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (HIGH? ? OR HIGHEST OR LOW? ? OR LOWEST OR COMPETITIVE? OR NON()COMPETITIVE?)
S5	832	S1 AND (S2 OR S3 OR S4)
S6	6	S5 AND (REWARD? OR PENALT?)
S7	6	RD (unique items)

7/5/1 (Item 1 from file: 2)  
DIALOG(R)File 2:INSPEC  
(c) 2002 Institution of Electrical Engineers. All rts. reserv.

5240833 INSPEC Abstract Number: C9605-1290D-082

**Title: Withdrawable bids as winner's curse insurance**

Author(s): Harstad, R.M.; Rothkopf, M.H.

Author Affiliation: Rutgers Univ., New Brunswick, NJ, USA

Journal: Operations Research vol.43, no.6 p.983-94

Publisher: Oper. Res. Soc,

Publication Date: Nov.-Dec. 1995 Country of Publication: USA

CODEN: OPREAI ISSN: 0030-364X

SICI: 0030-364X(199511/12)43:6L:983:WBWC;1-5

Material Identity Number: 0012-96004

U.S. Copyright Clearance Center Code: 0030-364X/95/4306-0983\$01.25

Language: English Document Type: Journal Paper (JP)

Treatment: Theoretical (T)

Abstract: When bidders have a common value or strongly affiliated values for an object or contract being **auctioned** by sealed bids, it is possible that the maker of a rational and apparently winning bid would, upon learning the competing bids, prefer losing the **auction** to honoring his bid. The ability to withdraw a bid, perhaps at a cost, in such circumstances provides a form of "winner's curse insurance". Bidding with such insurance is analyzed, obtaining the general **condition** for rational **bid** withdrawal and sufficient **conditions** for the existence of an equilibrium with more aggressive bidding. Next, the authors define a "compensation **penalties** " bid withdrawal **penalty** scheme and show that with it the bid-taker is better off on the average than if bid withdrawal is impossible. Finally, the authors find equilibrium bidding and withdrawal strategies in a multiplicative model as a function of the magnitude of the bid withdrawal **penalty** and of the bid-taker's likelihood, after a withdrawal, of honoring the second-best bid. This model has cases in which allowing withdrawal at a cost is in the bid-taker's interest and ones in which it is not. (22 Refs)

Subfile: C

Descriptors: decision theory; finance; statistical analysis

Identifiers: withdrawable bids; winner's curse insurance; sealed bids; bidding; compensation **penalties** bid withdrawal **penalty** scheme; multiplicative model; second-best bid

Class Codes: C1290D (Systems theory applications in economics and business); C1140E (Game theory)

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7/5/2 (Item 1 from file: 35)  
DIALOG(R)File 35:Dissertation Abs Online  
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01849858 ORDER NO: AADAA-I3026864

**Essays in multi-unit auction theory**

Author: McAdams, David Lloyd

Degree: Ph.D.

Year: 2001

Corporate Source/Institution: Stanford University (0212)

Adviser: Robert B. Wilson

Source: VOLUME 62/09-A OF DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL.

PAGE 3122. 137 PAGES

Descriptors: ECONOMICS, GENERAL ; ECONOMICS, THEORY

Descriptor Codes: 0501; 0511

ISBN: 0-493-38297-6

This dissertation consists of three papers that develop the theory of equilibrium in **auctions** of multiple identical objects ("multi-unit **auctions** &rdquo;). In the first, "Isotone Equilibrium in Games of

Incomplete Information, I develop the basic theory of existence of isotone pure strategy equilibrium (IPSE) in games of incomplete information in which players have multi-dimensional actions and multi-dimensional types. An IPSE exists in any such game in which each player's action set is a finite lattice and interim expected payoff function satisfies (i) the Milgrom-Shannon single-crossing property in his action and type and (ii) quasipermodularity in his action. In the second, "Isotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions", I apply this result to all commonly studied multi-unit auctions. The key step here is to prove that each bidder's valuation for what he wins is always *modular* and hence quasipermodular in his own bid in any multi-unit auction in which the allocation is determined by market clearing. In the third, "Collusive-Seeming Equilibria in the Uniform-Price Auction", I show that the lowest-price (collusive-seeming) equilibria of the uniform-price auction are not robust to certain modifications of the rules. In particular, such equilibria do not exist when supply is increasable or when the payment rule is perturbed to reward aggressive bidding.

7/5/3 (Item 2 from file: 35)

DIALOG(R) File 35:Dissertation Abs Online

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01606967 ORDER NO: AADNQ-20562

**ESSAYS IN FIRM BEHAVIOUR: COOPERATIVE R&D AND COMPETITIVE BIDDING**

Author: GUNDERSON, ALAN L.

Degree: PH.D.

Year: 1997

Corporate Source/Institution: QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY AT KINGSTON (CANADA) (0283)

Source: VOLUME 58/09-A OF DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL. PAGE 3657. 129 PAGES

Descriptors: ECONOMICS, THEORY

Descriptor Codes: 0511

ISBN: 0-612-20562-2

The thesis comprises three essays which examine firm behaviour in the context of investing to acquire market power through developing or using new technology. In the first essay (chapter 2) we analyze how competition in the market for a new product innovation affects the formation and size of Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). Research efforts are directed at acquiring the patent for the technology to produce a new product. Firms conducting research benefit from cooperation through the creation of synergies which increases the probability of innovating. However, cooperation also reduces the reward to innovation since firms must share the revenues from the post-innovation product market. We show that market performance can be improved if RJVs include ancillary restraints which limit future competition among members. This occurs if the deadweight loss experienced in the product market is outweighed by the elimination of duplicative research. For industries with a sufficiently large number of firms, only a unique RJV size can exist in equilibrium. However, for small industry sizes multiple equilibria can exist. Furthermore, the size of the RJV relative to the size of the industry, increases in the amount of synergies made possible from cooperation. When the social surplus from the innovation exceeds the monopoly rent, too much cooperation among firms may occur in equilibrium.

The second essay (chapter 3) identifies conditions where cooperative behaviour in research and development improves market performance in a differential game where firms sell differentiated products over time. Research serves to reduce marginal production costs and increases a stock of knowledge common to an industry. We analyze and compare three different scenarios; (i) firms cooperate in R&D by forming a Research Joint Venture which maximizes joint profits; (ii) firms compete in R&D using feedback strategies; and (iii) firms compete in R&D using open-loop strategies. In

the steady-state, cooperative R&D exceeds competitive R&D when the spillover rate is above a certain threshold. This threshold is largest when products are very close substitutes and the discount rate is large. Given the amount of product differentiation there exists a range of spillovers for which cooperation improves market performance at every moment in time. For spillovers greater than this range cooperation improves market performance in the steady-state but perhaps not over the entire time horizon. R&D competition in feedback strategies more closely approximates the cooperative solution than competition in open-loop strategies.

In the final essay (chapter 4) we examine and compare the effects of a seller concealing more or less information during the course of an **auction**. The **auction** allows firms to bid for an asset which they must acquire before they can use the technology they have developed from previous R&D. We show that a firm benefits from jump bidding only if its distribution of valuations is discontinuous and if some information, such as the identity of the bidders or the amounts of all valid **bids** except the **highest**, is concealed during the course of the bidding. The more information that a seller conceals, the higher a bidder is willing to jump bid in order to signal its valuation and the larger is the set of jump bid equilibria. Finally, we show that the expected revenue of the seller decreases when a jump bid equilibrium exists.

7/5/4 (Item 1 from file: 474)

DIALOG(R)File 474:New York Times Abs

(c) 2002 The New York Times. All rts. reserv.

06786054 NYT Sequence Number: 044911940715

**FORMER SALOMON TRADER TO PAY \$1.1 MILLION FINE**

New York Times, Col. 5, Pg. 1, Sec. D

Friday July 15 1994

DOCUMENT TYPE: Newspaper JOURNAL CODE: NYT LANGUAGE: English

RECORD TYPE: Abstract

ABSTRACT:

Paul W Mozer, former head of Salomon Brothers Inc's Government securities trading, will pay \$1.1 million fine and accept permanent ban from securities industry for his role in 1991 Treasury bond **auction** scandal; Securities and Exchange Commission announces terms of settlement of its civil lawsuit against Mozer; if case had gone to trial, Mozer could have been forced to pay triple damages in insider trading portion of case; Mozer neither admits nor denies wrongdoing in settlement of SEC suit; he pleaded guilty to two felony counts of lying to Federal Reserve Bank of NY and has served four months in prison; SEC suit accuses Mozer of arranging **submission** of eight false **bids** totaling \$13.5 billion in seven Treasury bond **auctions** from 1989 to 1991; Mozer is also accused of selling his Salomon stock three days before scandal became public; photo (M)

SPECIAL FEATURES: Photo

COMPANY NAMES: SALOMON BROTHERS INC; SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC)

DESCRIPTORS: FINANCES; GOVERNMENT BONDS; INSIDERS INFORMATION; FINES ( **PENALTIES** ); PERJURY; FRAUDS AND SWINDLING

PERSONAL NAMES: BRADSHER, KEITH; MOZER, PAUL W

GEOGRAPHIC NAMES: UNITED STATES

7/5/5 (Item 2 from file: 474)

DIALOG(R)File 474:New York Times Abs

(c) 2002 The New York Times. All rts. reserv.

05798993 NYT Sequence Number: 190886900708

**FROM A WRITER'S STANDPOINT, REWARDS ARE WORTH THE RISKS**

ESZTERHAS, JOE

New York Times, Col. 3, Pg. 11, Sec. 2

Sunday July 8 1990

DOCUMENT TYPE: Newspaper JOURNAL CODE: NYT LANGUAGE: English  
RECORD TYPE: Abstract

ABSTRACT:

Article on frenzy over movie scripts written on speculation and **auctioned to highest bidder** ; says what writing a script on spec and then selling it in an **auction** does is give the writer power to protect his work (L)

DESCRIPTORS: MOTION PICTURES; **AUCTIONS**  
PERSONAL NAMES: ESZTERHAS, JOE

7/5/6 (Item 1 from file: 475)  
DIALOG(R)File 475:Wall Street Journal Abs  
(c) 2002 The New York Times. All rts. reserv.

06539985

**SALOMON TO PAY \$67 MILLION TO SETTLE SUIT**

Wall Street Journal, Col. 3, Pg. 1, Sec. C  
Friday June 11 1993

DOCUMENT TYPE: Newspaper JOURNAL CODE: WSJ LANGUAGE: English  
RECORD TYPE: Abstract

ABSTRACT:

Salomon Inc will pay as much as \$67 million to dispose of litigation arising out of its 1991 Treasury- **auction bidding** scandal as part of **agreement** with New York federal court; will pay \$54.5 million to investors as part of class action suit and \$12.5 million in attorneys' fees; does not acknowledge any violation of law (M)

COMPANY NAMES: SALOMON INC

DESCRIPTORS: SUITS AND LITIGATION; CLASS-ACTION SUITS; FINES ( **PENALTIES** )  
; LAWYERS; FEES (PROFESSIONAL); TREASURY BONDS  
?

File 9:Business & Industry(R) Jul/1994-2002/Dec 19  
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(c) 1999 Business Wire  
File 813:PR Newswire 1987-1999/Apr 30  
(c) 1999 PR Newswire Association Inc

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Set	Items	Description
S1	361622	(AUCTION? OR DUTCHAUTION? OR DUTCH()AUCTION? OR REVERSE()-AUCTION?) OR EBAY OR ONLINE()COM OR "ONLINE.COM"
S2	43621	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (5N) (RULE? ? OR POLICY - OR POLICIES OR CONDITION? ? OR AGREEMENT? OR GUIDELINE? OR GUIDE()LINE? OR PARAMETER? OR REQUIREMENT? OR SPECS? OR SPECIFICATION? OR REGULATION? OR QUALIFICATION?)
S3	9634	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (LEVEL OR LEVELS OR BEHAVIOR? OR BEHAVIOUR? OR SUBMISS?)
S4	91288	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (HIGH? ? OR HIGHEST OR LOW? ? OR LOWEST OR COMPETITIVE? OR NON()COMPETITIVE?)
S5	5877	S1(5N) (S2 OR S3 OR S4)
S6	9	S5(5N) (REWARD? OR PENALT?)
S7	9	RD (unique items)



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S1	361622	(AUCTION? OR DUTCHAUTION? OR DUTCH()AUCTION? OR REVERSE()-AUCTION?) OR EBAY OR ONLINE()COM OR "ONLINE.COM"
S2	43621	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (5N) (RULE? ? OR POLICY -OR POLICIES OR CONDITION? ? OR AGREEMENT? OR GUIDELINE? OR GUIDE()LINE? OR PARAMETER? OR REQUIREMENT? OR SPECS? OR SPECIFICATION? OR REGULATION? OR QUALIFICATION?)
S3	9634	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (LEVEL OR LEVELS OR BEHAVIOR? OR BEHAVIOUR? OR SUBMISS?)
S4	91288	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (HIGH? ? OR HIGHEST OR LOW? ? OR LOWEST OR COMPETITIVE? OR NON()COMPETITIVE?)
S5	5877	S1(5N) (S2 OR S3 OR S4)
S6	9	S5(5N) (REWARD? OR PENALT?)
S7	9	RD (unique items)

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S1	361622	(AUCTION? OR DUTCHAUCTION? OR DUTCH()AUCTION? OR REVERSE()-AUCTION?) OR EBAY OR ONLINE()COM OR "ONLINE.COM"
S2	43621	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (5N) (RULE? ? OR POLICY - OR POLICIES OR CONDITION? ? OR AGREEMENT? OR GUIDELINE? OR GUIDE()LINE? OR PARAMETER? OR REQUIREMENT? OR SPECS? OR SPECIFICATION? OR REGULATION? OR QUALIFICATION?)
S3	9634	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (LEVEL OR LEVELS OR BEHAVIOR? OR BEHAVIOUR? OR SUBMISS?)
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S5	5877	S1(5N) (S2 OR S3 OR S4)
S6	9	S5(5N) (REWARD? OR PENALT?)
S7	9	RD (unique items)

7/3,K/1 (Item 1 from file: 9)  
DIALOG(R)File 9:Business & Industry(R)  
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03505273 (USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**ReFlow Throws a Lifeline to Funds Seeing Red**  
**(ReFlow Management launches new business)**  
Mutual Fund Market News, p N/A  
July 29, 2002  
DOCUMENT TYPE: Newsletter (United States)  
LANGUAGE: English RECORD TYPE: Fulltext  
WORD COUNT: 812

(USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULLTEXT)

TEXT:

...fund companies and minimize the impact on fees to shareholders while offering liquidity, ReFlow's **Dutch auction bidding process rewards the low bidder** of the day

ReFlow will make \$50 million available to funds, money supplied by a...

7/3,K/2 (Item 2 from file: 9)  
DIALOG(R)File 9:Business & Industry(R)  
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02722796 (USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**Supermodel, Quarterback Team for UltimateBid**  
**(UltimateBid.com signs multi-year agreements with Joe Montana and Heidi Klum to be spokespersons and equity partners)**  
DM News, v 22, n 6, p 21+  
February 14, 2000  
DOCUMENT TYPE: Journal; News Brief ISSN: 0194-3588 (United States)  
LANGUAGE: English RECORD TYPE: Fulltext  
WORD COUNT: 92

(USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULLTEXT)

TEXT:

...equity partners with the online auction company.

Klum and Montana will promote and host online **auctions** that **reward the highest bidders** with celebrity-styled outings with entertainment and sports stars. One current auction allows the winning...

7/3,K/3 (Item 1 from file: 15)  
DIALOG(R)File 15:ABI/Inform(R)  
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02214839 78871347  
**Sovereignty for sale**  
Drezner, Daniel W  
Foreign Policy n126 PP: 76-77 Sep/Oct 2001  
ISSN: 0015-7228 JRNL CODE: GFOR  
WORD COUNT: 1016

...ABSTRACT: is as likely to occur by choice **as** by force. Today, many small countries voluntarily **auction** off their sovereignty to the **highest bidder**, reaping great **rewards** in the process. In some respects, it has never been so profitable to be a...

...TEXT: is as likely to occur by choice as by force. Today, many small countries voluntarily **auction** off their sovereignty to the **highest**

**bidder** , reaping great **rewards** in the process. In some respects, it has never been so profitable to be a...

7/3,K/4 (Item 2 from file: 15)  
DIALOG(R)File 15:ABI/Inform(R)  
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02041181 55490430  
**Commercial loan site links lenders and borrowers--in real time**  
Bielski, Lauren  
American Bankers Association. ABA Banking Journal v92n6 PP: 65-66 Jun 2000  
ISSN: 0194-5947 JRNL CODE: BNK  
WORD COUNT: 769

...TEXT: reverse," because it's a market-making auction that drives down the price, unlike traditional **Dutch auctions** that **reward** the **highest bidder** .

Oinke protects all parties involved. For example, the borrower isn't committed to the terms...

7/3,K/5 (Item 3 from file: 15)  
DIALOG(R)File 15:ABI/Inform(R)  
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00742393 93-91614  
**Auctioneering 101**  
Anonymous  
D&B Reports v42n3 PP: 13 May/Jun 1993  
ISSN: 0746-6110 JRNL CODE: DBR  
WORD COUNT: 359

...TEXT: financial reasons. But on the other side of the coin," he adds, "selling at public **auctions** to the **highest bidder** , for whatever reason, is very **rewarding** ."

7/3,K/6 (Item 4 from file: 15)  
DIALOG(R)File 15:ABI/Inform(R)  
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00698036 93-47257  
**All-source bidding: The purchased power market in flux**  
Cross, Phillip S  
Public Utilities Fortnightly v131n8 PP: 55-58 Apr 15, 1993  
ISSN: 0033-3808 JRNL CODE: PUF  
WORD COUNT: 2544

...TEXT: bear risks comparable to those faced by their competitors. Failure to correctly match risks and **rewards** could result in actual **low -cost bidders** losing the **auction** ."

Similarly, the Oregon Public Utility Commission approved an all-source supply-side bidding process for...

7/3,K/7 (Item 5 from file: 15)  
DIALOG(R)File 15:ABI/Inform(R)  
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00573735 91-48085  
**Television Franchises: You Ain't Seen Nothin' Yet**

Anonymous  
Economist v320n7725 PP: 68-70 Sep 21, 1991  
ISSN: 0013-0613 JRNL CODE: ECT  
WORD COUNT: 1672

...TEXT: be controversial. That will please the lawyers, anyway.

Under the hammer

It is an odd **auction** that **rewards** **low bids** and rejects **high** ones. Yet, if industry gossip is right, the current sale of Channel Three TV operating...

7/3,K/8 (Item 1 from file: 20)  
DIALOG(R)File 20:Dialog Global Reporter  
(c) 2002 The Dialog Corp. All rts. reserv.

09764911 (USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**Land reforms must to boost economy**  
ABDUL GHAFOOR KHAN  
BUSINESS RECORDER  
February 25, 2000  
JOURNAL CODE: WBRE LANGUAGE: English RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT  
WORD COUNT: 3650

(USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULLTEXT)

... inheritance, gift or purchase. No land may be leased to non-cultivators, even as grant/ **reward** . The orchards may be **auctioned** to the **highest bidders** and run on corporate lines. The shikargahs may be given to the Forest and Wild...

7/3,K/9 (Item 1 from file: 613)  
DIALOG(R)File 613:PR Newswire  
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00629203 20010819LASU004 (USE FORMAT 7 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**Cell Phone Boom in Africa Transforms Continent; Could Help 'Bridge the Technology Gap' with Developed Nations**  
PR Newswire  
Sunday, August 19, 2001 14:08 EDT  
JOURNAL CODE: PR LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT  
DOCUMENT TYPE: NEWSWIRE  
WORD COUNT: 2,794

...from national coffers  
under military rule -- a risk inherent in a first-past-the-post **auction** that  
**rewards** the **highest bidders** . Moreover, the **auction** was poorly timed for the  
European telcos

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 File 477:Irish Times 1999-2002/Dec 20  
     (c) 2002 Irish Times  
 File 710:Times/Sun.Times(London) Jun 1988-2002/Dec 20  
     (c) 2002 Times Newspapers  
 File 711:Independent(London) Sep 1988-2002/Dec 09  
     (c) 2002 Newspaper Publ. PLC  
 File 756:Daily/Sunday Telegraph 2000-2002/Dec 20  
     (c) 2002 Telegraph Group  
 File 757:Mirror Publications/Independent Newspapers 2000-2002/Dec 20  
     (c) 2002  
 File 387:The Denver Post 1994-2002/Dec 19  
     (c) 2002 Denver Post  
 File 471:New York Times Fulltext 90-Day 2002/Dec 20  
     (c) 2002 The New York Times  
 File 492:Arizona Repub/Phoenix Gaz 19862002/Jan 06  
     (c) 2002 Phoenix Newspapers  
 File 494:St LouisPost-Dispatch 1988-2002/Dec 19  
     (c) 2002 St Louis Post-Dispatch  
 File 498:Detroit Free Press 1987-2002/Dec 18  
     (c) 2002 Detroit Free Press Inc.  
 File 631:Boston Globe 1980-2002/Dec 19  
     (c) 2002 Boston Globe  
 File 633:Phil.Inquirer 1983-2002/Dec 06  
     (c) 2002 Philadelphia Newspapers Inc  
 File 638:Newsday/New York Newsday 1987-2002/Dec 17  
     (c) 2002 Newsday Inc.  
 File 640:San Francisco Chronicle 1988-2002/Dec 20  
     (c) 2002 Chronicle Publ. Co.  
 File 641:Rocky Mountain News Jun 1989-2002/Dec 19  
     (c) 2002 Scripps Howard News  
 File 702:Miami Herald 1983-2002/Nov 17  
     (c) 2002 The Miami Herald Publishing Co.  
 File 703:USA Today 1989-2002/Dec 19  
     (c) 2002 USA Today  
 File 704:(Portland)The Oregonian 1989-2002/Dec 18  
     (c) 2002 The Oregonian  
 File 713:Atlanta J/Const. 1989-2002/Dec 19  
     (c) 2002 Atlanta Newspapers  
 File 714:(Baltimore) The Sun 1990-2002/Dec 19  
     (c) 2002 Baltimore Sun  
 File 715:Christian Sci.Mon. 1989-2002/Dec 20  
     (c) 2002 Christian Science Monitor  
 File 725:(Cleveland)Plain Dealer Aug 1991-2000/Dec 13  
     (c) 2000 The Plain Dealer  
 File 735:St. Petersburg Times 1989- 2000/Nov 01  
     (c) 2000 St. Petersburg Times

?ds

Set	Items	Description
S1	236698	(AUCTION? OR DUTCHAUCTION? OR DUTCH()AUCTION? OR REVERSE()-AUCTION?) OR EBAY OR ONLINE()COM OR "ONLINE.COM"
S2	20448	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (5N) (RULE? ? OR POLICY - OR POLICIES OR CONDITION? ? OR AGREEMENT? OR GUIDELINE? OR GUIDE()LINE? OR PARAMETER? OR REQUIREMENT? OR SPECS? OR SPECIFICATION? OR REGULATION? OR QUALIFICATION?)
S3	2590	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (LEVEL OR LEVELS OR BEHAVIOR? OR BEHAVIOUR? OR SUBMISS?)
S4	59313	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (HIGH? ? OR HIGHEST OR LOW? ? OR LOWEST OR COMPETITIVE? OR NON()COMPETITIVE?)
S5	8021	S1(S) (S2 OR S3 OR S4)
S6	36	S5(S) (REWARD? OR PENALT?)

S7 19 S6 NOT PY>1999  
S8 19 RD (unique items)

8/3,K/1 (Item 1 from file: 635)  
DIALOG(R)File 635:Business Dateline(R)  
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0697625 96-54968

**Gentle giant or ruthless investor?**

Poppe, David  
Florida Trend (St Petersburg, FL, US), V39 N1 p94  
PUBL DATE: 960500  
WORD COUNT: 1,799  
DATELINE: West Palm Beach, FL, US, South Atlantic

TEXT:

...gets its tax money hassle-free this way.

Investors buy liens--called tax certificates--by **bidding** the **lowest** interest rate they will accept from a property owner in exchange for paying his taxes...

...making loans to delinquent taxpayers. In Florida, a delinquent taxpayer must pay a minimum 5% **penalty**, even if he pays his taxes the day after an **auction**.

A tax certificate usually is a safe investment, akin to a well-collateralized bond. Capital...

8/3,K/2 (Item 2 from file: 635)  
DIALOG(R)File 635:Business Dateline(R)  
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0482915 94-36673

**Grumman auction: The Company wants all bids by Thursday**

Bernstein, James  
Newsday (Melville, NY, US) sA p3  
PUBL DATE: 940329  
WORD COUNT: 1,369  
DATELINE: New York, NY, US

TEXT:

...it would bid or not, but was clearly not pleased at the prospect of an **auction**, saying that action would perpetuate "the unlevel playing field." A letter from Northrop Chairman Kent Kresa said that, since his company already submitted the **high bid**, "Grumman is proposing that Northrop bid against itself." Kresa said Grumman's rules prevent Northrop ...

...the best price. He also complained that Martin's merger pact imposes a \$50-million **penalty** on Grumman --and by extension on Northrop if it sells to another company.

The auction...

8/3,K/3 (Item 1 from file: 476)  
DIALOG(R)File 476:Financial Times Fulltext  
(c) 2002 Financial Times Ltd. All rts. reserv.

0007010689 B0DEGCQAD9FT

**The Lex Column: LWT**

Financial Times, P 18  
Friday, May 7, 1993  
DOCUMENT TYPE: NEWSPAPER LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT  
Word Count: 95



TEXT:

...No-one can dispute the contribution LWT's management has made in hanging tough and **bidding low** in the farce that was the television franchise **auction**. But other successful directors like those of Scottish and Central have not been recompensed on anything like the same scale. LWT's managers' **rewards** are out of all proportion to the risks they ran or the effort they expended.

8/3,K/4 (Item 2 from file: 476)

DIALOG(R)File 476:Financial Times Fulltext  
(c) 2002 Financial Times Ltd. All rts. reserv.

0006042843 B0BJ1BWACLFT

**TV auction outcry for wrong reasons**

SAMUEL BRITTAN

Financial Times, P 17

Monday, October 28, 1991

DOCUMENT TYPE: NEWSPAPER LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT

Word Count: 934

...Gyngell's TV-am lost the breakfast franchise to Sunrise - in this case genuinely the **highest bidder**. She was apparently 'heartbroken' because of TV-am's successful efforts to break the stranglehold of the television unions. A competitive **auction** is not, however, a way of **rewarding** past services, but a deliberately impersonal method of allocating a scarce resource. There has always...

8/3,K/5 (Item 3 from file: 476)

DIALOG(R)File 476:Financial Times Fulltext  
(c) 2002 Financial Times Ltd. All rts. reserv.

0006042395 B0BJ3BFAB2FT

**Salomon in Dollars 200m charge to cover possible liability**

PATRICK HARVERSON

Financial Times, P 25

Wednesday, October 30, 1991

DOCUMENT TYPE: NEWSPAPER LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT

Word Count: 385

...7/8 .

Salomon said Dollars 200m was being put aside to cover 'potential settlements, judgments, **penalties**, fines, litigation expense and other costs' related to actions in the bond markets. In August, Salomon admitted submitting false customer **bids** and breaking government **rules** in Treasury **auctions** stretching back to 1990.

Profits for the quarter would have been lower but for changes...

8/3,K/6 (Item 4 from file: 476)

DIALOG(R)File 476:Financial Times Fulltext  
(c) 2002 Financial Times Ltd. All rts. reserv.

0005057006 B09LNBGABMFT

**Leading Article: Post-Reithian broadcasting**

Financial Times, P 18

Thursday, December 14, 1989

DOCUMENT TYPE: NEWSPAPER LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT

Word Count: 644

...its public service obligations.

Ill-defined threshold

The biggest source of controversy is the proposed **auctioning** of Channel 3 and 5 licences. Under present plans, applicants will have to meet an...

...companies. Once past this hurdle, the franchises will be awarded to the companies offering the **highest** cash **bid**. In theory, the ITC will be able to impose financial **penalties** on franchise-holders who renege on quality commitments.

The Government argues that a competitive tender...

8/3,K/7 (Item 1 from file: 710)  
DIALOG(R) File 710:Times/Sun.Times(London)  
(c) 2002 Times Newspapers. All rts. reserv.

13708224

**INVENTORS DRAW UP BLUEPRINT FOR MAKING A PROFIT; IN BUSINESS**

Times of London (TL) - Tuesday, July 27, 1999

By: Henrietta Lake

Section: Features

Word Count: 648

...as well as teach them about disclosure and intellectual property."

The academy then plans to **auction** ideas to the **highest bidder** or bring in finance so that inventors can set up their own venture. Importantly, it...

... the inventor retains enough of a stake in the company to reap a proper financial **reward**.

8/3,K/8 (Item 2 from file: 710)  
DIALOG(R) File 710:Times/Sun.Times(London)  
(c) 2002 Times Newspapers. All rts. reserv.

07483064

**Prize victories in the ring; Art Market Diary**

Times of London (TL) - Friday, June 25, 1993

By: Sarah Jane Checkland

Section: Features

Word Count: 299

The **Auctions** ( **Bidding** **Agreements** ) Act of 1927 makes it illegal to offer a "consideration...or **reward** " for having abstained from bidding at **auction** : the museums are clearly not guilty of that. The issue is whether, by failing to...

8/3,K/9 (Item 1 from file: 492)  
DIALOG(R) File 492:Arizona Repub/Phoenix Gaz  
(c) 2002 Phoenix Newspapers. All rts. reserv.

06015122

**SHORT TAKES**

ARIZONA REPUBLIC (AR) - TUESDAY January 15, 1991

By: Compiled from reports by The Associated Press, San Francisco Chronicle, The New York Times, Knight-Ridder and the Short Takes staff.

Edition: FINAL CHASER Section: Life And Leisure Page: D3

Word Count: 344

... homes and other property -- seized by the IRS in November -- will be

sold to the **highest bidder** . **Auctions** will take place Jan. 23, 25 and 29 in Austin. Nelson owes \$16.7 million in back taxes and **penalties** .

'Kung Fu,' 'Chan' co-star is dead

Actor Keye Luke, who played Charlie Chan's...

8/3,K/10 (Item 1 from file: 631)  
DIALOG(R)File 631:Boston Globe  
(c) 2002 Boston Globe. All rts. reserv.

06620034

**BROWN CALLS FUND-RAISING 'PROSTITUTION' HE ASSERTS CLINTON AND BUSH ARE ON SALE TO HIGHEST BIDDERS**

Boston Globe (BG) - WEDNESDAY, April 29, 1992  
By: Chris Black, Globe Staff  
Edition: THIRD Section: NATIONAL/FOREIGN Page: 25  
Word Count: 417

...said.

Earlier at Notre Dame University in South Bend, he chided the Clinton campaign for **rewarding** the biggest fund-raisers for last night's Boston event with a ride from Logan Airport to the event. "Clinton has auctioned off to the **highest bidder** a seat in his car to his \$1,000 dinner," he said.

The Democrats, he...

8/3,K/11 (Item 2 from file: 631)  
DIALOG(R)File 631:Boston Globe  
(c) 2002 Boston Globe. All rts. reserv.

03155744

**NAMES AND FACES**

BOSTON GLOBE (BG) - WEDNESDAY July 17, 1985  
By: by Adele Foy, Globe Staff  
Edition: THIRD Section: NATIONAL/FOREIGN Page: 2  
Word Count: 127

TEXT:

Soldier of Fortune magazine says it will pay a \$1 million **reward** to a pilot or crew member who defects from Nicaragua with a high-tech, Mi...

... analysts will study it, the magazine will write about it, and the aircraft will be **auctioned** to the **highest bidder** , said Jim Pate, the magazine's associate editor. "Of course, we would not sell it...

... it to the US government because they'll probably offer more money for it." The **reward** is available only to Nicaraguan, Soviet, East German or Cuban pilots, crew members or trainers...

8/3,K/12 (Item 1 from file: 638)  
DIALOG(R)File 638:Newsday/New York Newsday  
(c) 2002 Newsday Inc. All rts. reserv.

07588023

**Grumman Auction The Company Wants All Bids by Thursday**

Newsday (ND) - Tuesday March 29, 1994  
By: James Bernstein. STAFF WRITER  
Edition: NASSAU AND SUFFOLK Section: NEWS Page: A03  
Word Count: 1,039

...it would bid or not, but was clearly not pleased at the prospect of an **auction**, saying that action would perpetuate "the unlevel playing field." A letter from Northrop Chairman Kent Kresa said that, since his company already submitted the **high bid**, "Grumman is proposing that Northrop bid against itself." Kresa said Grumman's rules prevent Northrop...

... the best price. He also complained that Martin's merger pact imposes a \$50-million **penalty** on Grumman - and by extension on Northrop - if it sells to another company.

The auction...

8/3,K/13 (Item 1 from file: 640)  
DIALOG(R)File 640:San Francisco Chronicle  
(c) 2002 Chronicle Publ. Co. All rts. reserv.

04525193

**KOFY LAUNCHING NEW LINEUP OF DJS**  
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (SF) - SUNDAY May 15, 1988  
By: Ben Fong-Torres  
Edition: SUNDAY Section: SUNDAY DATEBOOK Page: 66  
Word Count: 1,099

... Justin Herman Plaza, tooting "Louie Louie" on kazoos. At parade's end, they'll be **rewarded** with a marathon version of the forever-young oldie sung by its composer, Richard Berry. To register, call 781-4270 . . . The **highest bidder** for lunch with me - an item at an **auction** to benefit Project Open Hand - came from publicist-turned-writer Nancy Hoffman, who forked over...

...as a free-lancer (you can't). But we had a swell lunch that helped **auction** producer Robert Noble raise \$26,000 for Open Hand (which provides hot meals to AIDS...

8/3,K/14 (Item 1 from file: 702)  
DIALOG(R)File 702:Miami Herald  
(c) 2002 The Miami Herald Publishing Co. All rts. reserv.

09194034

**NOBODY'LL AUCTION MY THINGS!**  
Miami Herald (MH) - Sunday, July 13, 1997  
By: JIM HAMPTON, Herald Editor  
Edition: Final Section: Editorial Page: 2L  
Word Count: 688

... I cringe at the possibility that, after Lillian and I have gone to our eternal **rewards** (hers will be in heaven; of mine I'm unsure), some **auctioneer** could come in, catalog our personal belongings, and sell them to the **highest bidder** ..

Private: Keep out!

I just can't endure the thought of a sluiceway of total...

8/3,K/15 (Item 2 from file: 702)  
DIALOG(R)File 702:Miami Herald  
(c) 2002 The Miami Herald Publishing Co. All rts. reserv.

08013211

**ASTUTE COLLECTORS OF PHOTOS KNOW PRICES WILL CLIMB**  
Miami Herald (MH) - SUN February 26, 1995

By: ANNE GILBERT Herald Columnist  
Edition: FINAL Section: HOME & DESIGN Page: 2G  
Word Count: 859

... alerting the public. It was attributed to Civil War photographer Mathew Brady.

At the same **auction**, other photographs by lesser-known 19th Century photographers went for as little as \$75. One of the reasons for **low bidding** and buy-ins was the wait-and-see attitude of many potential buyers. Their patience was **rewarded** with the 1981 Sotheby's record-breaking **auction**. Standards and prices for collectors were set . . . or so it seemed. Now, Sotheby's has yearly **auctions** of photographs. Many early and recent examples sell for more than \$70,000.

Another early...

8/3,K/16 (Item 1 from file: 713)  
DIALOG(R)File 713:Atlanta J/Const.  
(c) 2002 Atlanta Newspapers. All rts. reserv.

10007013

**SCHOOL WATCH 'RICH' KIDS LEARN THE WAYS OF MONEY**

Atlanta Journal-CONSTITUTION (AJ-CONSTITUTION) - Thursday, January 7, 1999

By: Mary Anne Gordon

Section: Rockdale Extra Page: JR/(CONSTITUTION): 03

Word Count: 759

**TEXT:**

...behavior and economics. Manget and LaMotte discovered that smiling faces and stickers were not effective **rewards** for fifth-graders. Five years ago, they began issuing pretend money as a **reward** for good behavior. The lesson doesn't stop with money in exchange for following the...

... a student is disciplined in class. Although bad behavior results in fines, good behavior is **rewarded** with bonuses. Acts of kindness or exemplary behavior during a fire drill are examples of...

... behavior pays off. At the end of the year, when parents donate merchandise for an **auction**, students who have accumulated vast wealth through good **behavior** can **bid** on **high**-ticket items. Just as students learn about the **rewards** of behaving, LaMotte has also learned a lesson from the class store. One year, he...

...to our class late in the year, so she only had about \$500 for the **auction**," LaMotte recalled. "An item came up for bid and the students had decided no one..."

8/3,K/17 (Item 1 from file: 714)  
DIALOG(R)File 714:(Baltimore) The Sun  
(c) 2002 Baltimore Sun. All rts. reserv.

08021071

**FORGET THE BOOK, DEMOCRATS**

BALTIMORE MORNING SUN (BS) - Saturday January 21, 1995

Edition: F Section: Editorial (Morning) Page: 10A

Word Count: 375

**TEXT:**

... urged him to take the next step, cancel the HarperCollins deal and accept the second- **highest bid** at the **auction** where the first deal was sealed. That would not be a severe **penalty**. According to publishing executives, the HarperCollins bid was less than 10 percent higher than the

...  
8/3,K/18 (Item 1 from file: 725)  
DIALOG(R)File 725:(Cleveland)Plain Dealer  
(c) 2000 The Plain Dealer. All rts. reserv.

09753045

**CRASS AND CLASS SHARE SPOTLIGHT**

Plain Dealer (Cleveland) (PD) - Thursday, September 10, 1998

By: Joe Dirck

Edition: FINAL / ALL Section: METRO Page: 1B

Word Count: 659

... another team, even one ripped from the heart of some other city if necessary.

We **rewarded** their shabby treatment by indebting ourselves for millions in public and private dollars, promising to...

...end of the bargain - pocketing an additional half billion for themselves in the process by **auctioning** off the Cleveland fiefdom to the **highest bidder**. They wrang it out of Lerner, but three guesses who will get stuck with the...

8/3,K/19 (Item 2 from file: 725)  
DIALOG(R)File 725:(Cleveland)Plain Dealer  
(c) 2000 The Plain Dealer. All rts. reserv.

08297124

**DIVIDING UP COMPANY TICKETS CAN BE PROBLEM**

Plain Dealer (Cleveland) (PD) - Tuesday, October 24, 1995

By: BECKY YERAK PLAIN DEALER REPORTER

Edition: FINAL / ALL Section: NATIONAL Page: 9A

Word Count: 474

...a drawing.

OfficeMax Inc. had three ways of doling out tickets. It had a silent **auction**, with the **highest bidder** getting tickets and the proceeds going to United Way. It got **bids** as **high** as \$400. OfficeMax also **rewarded** workers at different levels. Finally, it gave tickets to major institutional investors.

The loges of...

File 625:American Banker Publications 1981-2002/Dec 20  
 (c) 2002 American Banker  
 File 268:Banking Info Source 1981-2002/Dec W3  
 (c) 2002 ProQuest Info&Learning  
 File 626:Bond Buyer Full Text 1981-2002/Dec 20  
 (c) 2002 Bond Buyer  
 File 267:Finance & Banking Newsletters 2002/Dec 19  
 (c) 2002 The Dialog Corp.

?ds

Set	Items	Description
S1	15830	(AUCTION? OR DUTCHAUCTION? OR DUTCH()AUCTION? OR REVERSE()-AUCTION?) OR EBAY OR ONLINE()COM OR "ONLINE.COM"
S2	1314	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (5N) (RULE? ? OR POLICY -OR POLICIES OR CONDITION? ? OR AGREEMENT? OR GUIDELINE? OR GUIDE()LINE? OR PARAMETER? OR REQUIREMENT? OR SPECS? OR SPECIFICATION? OR REGULATION? OR QUALIFICATION?)
S3	373	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (LEVEL OR LEVELS OR BEHAVIOR? OR BEHAVIOUR? OR SUBMISS?)
S4	9528	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (HIGH? ? OR HIGHEST OR LOW? ? OR LOWEST OR COMPETITIVE? OR NON()COMPETITIVE?)
S5	625	S1(S) (S2 OR S3 OR S4)
S6	17	S5(S) (REWARD? OR PENALT?)
S7	6	S6 NOT PY>1999
S8	6	RD (unique items)

'8/3,K/1 (Item 1 from file: 625)  
DIALOG(R)File 625:American Banker Publications  
(c) 2002 American Banker. All rts. reserv.

0085957

**Under the Mexican Hat**

American Banker - December 31, 1987; Pg. 1; Vol. 152, No. 255  
WORD COUNT: 1,185

BYLINE:

By Martin Mayer

TEXT:

...fragmentation of the committees  
that have been managing these matters. Instead of allocating awards and  
**penalties** equally among the group of lenders, the new arrangements will  
create an **auction** at which the banks will **bid competitively** for the  
new  
bonds.

In the short and medium term, the bonds cost the Mexicans...

8/3,K/2 (Item 1 from file: 268)  
DIALOG(R)File 268:Banking Info Source  
(c) 2002 ProQuest Info&Learning. All rts. reserv.

00281670 (USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULLTEXT)

**Piling high to meet the quota**

Lee, Peter

Euromoney, v322, p85-89, Feb 1996 DOCUMENT TYPE: Journal Article

LANGUAGE: English RECORD TYPE: Abstract Fulltext

WORD COUNT: 03698

(USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULLTEXT)

... banks including Rossiisky Kredit, Inkombank and Alfa Bank.

To be valid, a loans-for-shares **auction** required at least two  
bidders. Finding a rival **bidder** so that this **requirement** could be  
fulfilled often became a tough challenge for a major participant. To  
qualify, bidders...

...the entire bid amount, free of interest, with the finance ministry one  
month before the **auction**. This often ran to many millions of dollars --  
\$500 million in the case of Yukos...

...yielding GKO market, which has provided 100% dollar returns. Few banks  
cared to forgo such **rewards** to take part in **auctions** that were almost  
certainly going to be rigged. Likely winning bidders sometimes had to  
prompt...

8/3,K/3 (Item 1 from file: 267)  
DIALOG(R)File 267:Finance & Banking Newsletters  
(c) 2002 The Dialog Corp. All rts. reserv.

04556131

**Shaking Things Up-Again Having revolutionized stocks, E\*trade's founder  
takes on the options world**

Dave Lindorff

Investment Dealers Digest

September 20,1999 DOCUMENT TYPE: NEWSLETTER

PUBLISHER: SECURITIES DATA PUBLISHING

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

WORD COUNT: 4736

RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT

(c) SECURITIES DATA PUBLISHING All Rts. Reserv.



TEXT:

...he neglects to mention is that the ISE has an unusual business structure that will **reward** him greatly if the upstart turns into a success.

Porter's assault on the options...the CBOE in April of 1997.

The ISE is set up to function as an **auction** market. Its 10 primary market makers will provide quotes in options of 60 companies. In...the situation anti-competitive. Moreover, he thinks the ISE should sell its seats in an **auction** process to the **highest bidder** the way seat holders on the New York Stock Exchange conduct the sales of their...an option can change within seconds.

Katz says the practice would put the ISE's **auction** system in jeopardy because market makers would lose their shirt if firms were allowed to exchanges to send orders to another exchange if it offered an even better **bid** or offer.

Instead, obscure **rules** keep the exchanges from competing with each other. For example, while options market makers are...

...the first exchange to show the size, or volume, of all orders at their best **bid** and offers. still, under current **rules** its market makers won't have to honor their best bids and offers when they...

8/3,K/4 (Item 2 from file: 267)

DIALOG(R)File 267:Finance & Banking Newsletters  
(c) 2002 The Dialog Corp. All rts. reserv.

04539729

**Latin Deal Makers, Making up the rules in Brazil**

Euromoney

September 10, 1998 PAGE: 138, 145 DOCUMENT TYPE: NEWSLETTER

PUBLISHER: EUROMONEY ELECTRONIC PUBLICATIONS

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

WORD COUNT: 3401

RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT

(c) EUROMONEY ELECTRONIC PUBLICATIONS All Rts. Reserv.

TEXT:

...Bozano was part, bought the steel-maker Usiminas in 1991.

"Twenty-four hours before the **auction** we were still discussing who was going to put what in and still putting the...

...the loss-making state bank Banerj for a fixed fee of just one cent. His **rewards** were to come through a success fee when the bank was subsequently sold to Banco...was

winning the mandate and he is impatient with those who suggest that the fees **bid** were too **low**. "If you win, break out the champagne; if you lose, keep quiet and get on...

...the past) as was the case with CVRD." (The Morgan Stanley consortia was disqualified by **bidding** too **low** the fixed-fee part of the mandate.) "We lost on a technicality. But you didn't...

8/3,K/5 (Item 3 from file: 267)

DIALOG(R)File 267:Finance & Banking Newsletters  
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00028037

**Why Acquirers Continue to Raise Their Sights**

Mergers & Acquisitions Journal

January/February, 1997 VOL: 31 ISSUE: 4 DOCUMENT TYPE: NEWSLETTER

PUBLISHER: INVESTMENT DEALERS DIGEST

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

WORD COUNT: 5564

RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT

TEXT:

...fewer share-swap transactions. The stock market has become more tolerant of good deals and **rewards** judicious consolidators but still applies a rigorous test to the sense and rationale of a...activity is going to continue and, if anything, accelerate. It is clear that the market **rewards** consolidators that do it effectively.

Sharpstone: Companies are under a lot of pressure to deliver...some dual viewpoints, sometimes penalizing companies making large acquisitions that might be slightly dilutive but **rewarding** consolidators. Is there any view on just how the stock market overall looks at acquisitions...

...acquirer overpaying?

If the deal satisfies both of those tests then the company should get **rewarded** in the market - and there have been a lot of large deals that have been **rewarded**. Some companies are surprised when we tell them that if you make a strategic acquisition...

...fair price and not overpay, you still need to communicate that in order to get **rewarded** in the marketplace. It is no good having a good story if you don't...Brown: It very much depends on the target. Some targets lend themselves to the multi- **bidder competitive** processes, but for other targets there are specific fits and specific requirements. Each client must decide the appropriate nature of the process based on the specific property for sale.

An **auction** process with the wrong property can be a disaster, but bilateral discussion for a property that ought to be **auctioned** can have adverse effects on pricing. It is a judgment call based on the property...

...this ultimately drives how you approach the marketplace. It may be that a sealed-bid **auction** is best, but the goals of the seller also may be achieved in a one...

...Sharpstone: I think there is greater concern today in the areas of confidentiality in private **auctions**. Shareholders and managements of target companies are concerned about **auctions** because a lot of industry knowledge may get into the marketplace. They may wish to...

...potential buyers are out there. A large universe of buyers lends itself better to an **auction** process than if there are only two or three buyers. We examine the constituencies like...

...We also have found that corporate buyers tend to be much less receptive to the **auction** process than financial buyers. The financial buyers generally adhere to deadlines. Corporate buyers, on the other hand, are generally not staffed to meet tight **auction** timelines. You need to be more flexible with corporate buyers.

M&A: Are you experiencing t typically have broad **auctions** on those deals and the potentially interested parties are limited. Otherwise, because in many instances...

8/3,K/6 (Item 4 from file: 267)

DIALOG(R)File 267:Finance & Banking Newsletters

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00009234

**Russiamoney, Locked assetsThe September deadline for the government to repay the loans in the controversial loans-for-shares scheme has come and gone**

Central European Magazine

October 00, 1996

DOCUMENT TYPE: NEWSLETTER

PUBLISHER: EUROMONEY ELECTRONIC PUBLICATIONS

(c) EUROMONEY ELECTRONIC PUBLICATIONS All Rts. Reserv.

## TEXT:

...said 'we're in a mess, we need cash now. Help us and we'll **reward** you with the stakes later'."

Holdings in Russia's most important companies were subsequently handed...

...away

chunks of Russia's largest companies to banks with chums in the cabinet. The **auctions** also provoked an international outcry because foreigners were totally excluded.

Bank Menatep now sees its...the original rules of the loans-for-shares scheme, the stake must be sold at **auction** to the **highest bidder**. As the custodian bank can deduct the amount loaned to the government from the sale price, in this case \$159m, it is likely to come forward with the best **bid**. The **regulations** require that any profits over and above the original loan are to be split, with...Alfa Group. A Moscow-based analyst agrees with him: "The prices they paid in the **auctions** were not so good in reality. It is only public opinion that believes they were..."

...to be set to launch more

loans-for-shares. "The state plans to hold new **auctions**," says Maria Florentieva, head of the mergers and acquisitions department at Inkombank. "Following the criticisms made after the last **auction**, we're working with the government on formulating new conditions of sale. According to Florientieva..."

...big

industrial concerns will be on offer. Other possibilities for inclusion in this round of **auctions** include Unified Energy Systems as well as sales to strategic investors of stakes in Rostelecom...

...in the negotiations. "The government is taking into account all the drawbacks of the 1995 **auction** in developing this new programme. It wants to make sure it is handled better and...but for publicity purposes, it is probably better to avoid such a situation."

The new **auctions** will probably take place in the first quarter of 1997, according to Yevgeny Yasin, minister...

...to ensure that other banks, aside from

Menatep and Unexim, which so dominated the previous **auctions**, are included.

"Really it would be better if they were not involved at all," says...

...to Bank Menatep than some company I had never heard of."

The loans-for-shares **auctions**

Bank	company	percentage	price
Uneximbank	Norilsk Nickel	38%	\$170m
Uneximbank	Sidanko	51%	\$130m
Bank Menatep...			
?			

File 16:Gale Group PROMT(R) 1990-2002/Dec 20  
(c) 2002 The Gale Group  
File 148:Gale Group Trade & Industry DB 1976-2002/Dec 19  
(c)2002 The Gale Group  
File 160:Gale Group PROMT(R) 1972-1989  
(c) 1999 The Gale Group  
File 275:Gale Group Computer DB(TM) 1983-2002/Dec 20  
(c) 2002 The Gale Group  
File 621:Gale Group New Prod.Annou.(R) 1985-2002/Dec 19  
(c) 2002 The Gale Group  
File 636:Gale Group Newsletter DB(TM) 1987-2002/Dec 20  
(c) 2002 The Gale Group  
File 570:Gale Group MARS(R) 1984-2002/Dec 20  
(c) 2002 The Gale Group

?ds

Set	Items	Description
S1	255494	(AUCTION? OR DUTCHAUCTION? OR DUTCH()AUCTION? OR REVERSE()-AUCTION?) OR EBAY OR ONLINE()COM OR "ONLINE.COM"
S2	30038	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (5N) (RULE? ? OR POLICY -OR POLICIES OR CONDITION? ? OR AGREEMENT? OR GUIDELINE? OR GUIDE()LINE? OR PARAMETER? OR REQUIREMENT? OR SPECS? OR SPECIFICATION? OR REGULATION? OR QUALIFICATION?)
S3	5458	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (LEVEL OR LEVELS OR BEHAVIOR? OR BEHAVIOUR? OR SUBMISS?)
S4	77311	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (HIGH? ? OR HIGHEST OR LOW? ? OR LOWEST OR COMPETITIVE? OR NON()COMPETITIVE?)
S5	5514	S1(5N) (S2 OR S3 OR S4)
S6	12	S5(5N) (REWARD? OR PENALT?)
S7	8	RD (unique items)

7/3,K/1 (Item 1 from file: 16)  
DIALOG(R)File 16:Gale Group PROMT(R)  
(c) 2002 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.

08914804 Supplier Number: 77305669 (USE FORMAT 7 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**Cell Phone Boom In Africa Transforms Continent; Could Help 'Bridge the Technology Gap' With Developed Nations.**  
PR Newswire, p2084  
August 19, 2001  
Language: English Record Type: Fulltext  
Document Type: Newswire; Trade  
Word Count: 2949

... from national coffers under military rule -- a risk inherent in a first-past-the-post **auction** that **rewards** the **highest bidders**. Moreover, the **auction** was poorly timed for the European telcos that had moved swiftly into other parts of...

7/3,K/2 (Item 2 from file: 16)  
DIALOG(R)File 16:Gale Group PROMT(R)  
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07483659 Supplier Number: 62800095 (USE FORMAT 7 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**Commercial loan site links lenders and borrowers--in real time. (online loan auction site Oinke) (Brief Article)**  
Bielski, Lauren  
ABA Banking Journal, v92, n6, p65  
June, 2000  
Language: English Record Type: Fulltext  
Article Type: Brief Article  
Document Type: Magazine/Journal; Trade  
Word Count: 775

... reverse," because it's a market-making auction that drives down the price, unlike traditional **Dutch auctions** that **reward** the **highest bidder**.

Oinke protects all parties involved. For example, the borrower isn't committed to the terms...

7/3,K/3 (Item 3 from file: 16)  
DIALOG(R)File 16:Gale Group PROMT(R)  
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05424286 Supplier Number: 48227053 (USE FORMAT 7 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**The Auction Lessons**  
Bahr, Susan J.  
America's Network, p10  
Jan 15, 1998  
Language: English Record Type: Fulltext  
Document Type: Magazine/Journal; Trade  
Word Count: 1450

... company to enter a niche market.

Companies should do their homework before coming to the **auction**. Review the **rules**, especially the **penalty rules** and collusion **rules**. Review the **bidding** strategies used in past **auctions**.

Basically, companies can do a lot of homework on their own. It's not necessary...

7/3,K/4 (Item 1 from file: 148)  
DIALOG(R)File 148:Gale Group Trade & Industry DB  
(c)2002 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.

06520232 SUPPLIER NUMBER: 13712504 (USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULL TEXT)  
**All-source bidding: the purchased power market in flux.**  
Cross, Phillip S.  
Public Utilities Fortnightly, 131, n8, 55(4)  
April 15, 1993  
ISSN: 0033-3808 LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT; ABSTRACT  
WORD COUNT: 2748 LINE COUNT: 00225

... bear risks comparable to those faced by their competitors. Failure to correctly match risks and **rewards** could result in actual **low -cost bidders** losing the **auction** ." Similarly, the Oregon Public Utility Commission approved an all-source supply-side bidding process for...

7/3,K/5 (Item 1 from file: 636)  
DIALOG(R)File 636:Gale Group Newsletter DB(TM)  
(c) 2002 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.

04200191 Supplier Number: 54922086 (USE FORMAT 7 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**NORTHWEST AIRLINES: Golfer's dream package up for bid in Northwest Airlines' first online auction.**  
M2 Presswire, pNA  
June 17, 1999  
Language: English Record Type: Fulltext  
Document Type: Newswire; Trade  
Word Count: 346

... to put their frequent flyer miles to work for a great cause and a great **reward** ."  
The online **auction** 's **highest bidder** will win a trip for two to the Ryder Cup golf tournament, which will be...

7/3,K/6 (Item 2 from file: 636)  
DIALOG(R)File 636:Gale Group Newsletter DB(TM)  
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03122583 Supplier Number: 46387228 (USE FORMAT 7 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**FCC EASES SOME FILING BURDENS FOR C-BLOCK WINNERS**  
PCS Week, v7, n20, pN/A  
May 15, 1996  
Language: English Record Type: Fulltext  
Document Type: Newsletter; Trade  
Word Count: 245

... 2 million bid for the Chattanooga, Tenn., license in round 37 of the C-block **auction** . Had the **bid withdrawal rules** been fully enforced, the **penalty** would have been \$73.8 million.  
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7/3,K/7 (Item 3 from file: 636)  
DIALOG(R)File 636:Gale Group Newsletter DB(TM)  
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02321310 Supplier Number: 44520068 (USE FORMAT 7 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**FCC TAKES SPECTRUM EXEMPTION AWAY FROM PUBLIC SAFETY FIRMS**  
Advanced Wireless Communications, v5, n6, pN/A  
March 16, 1994  
Language: English Record Type: Fulltext  
Document Type: Newsletter; Trade  
Word Count: 1328

... prevent bidders from waiting until the end of the auction before

participating as well as **penalties** for withdrawn **bids** .

When a **high bid** is withdrawn during an **auction** , the bidder will be required to pay the difference between the amount received for the...

7/3,K/8 (Item 4 from file: 636)

DIALOG(R)File 636:Gale Group Newsletter DB(TM)

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02321309 Supplier Number: 44520067 (USE FORMAT 7 FOR FULLTEXT)

**FCC ADOPTS 'GENERIC' AUCTION RULES, CLARIFIES PCS SPECTRUM ISSUES**

Advanced Wireless Communications, v5, n6, pN/A

March 16, 1994

Language: English Record Type: Fulltext

Document Type: Newsletter; Trade

Word Count: 963

... prevent bidders from waiting until the end of the auction before participating as well as **penalties** for withdrawn **bids** .

When a **high bid** is withdrawn during an **auction** , the bidder will be required to pay the difference between the amount received for the...

?

?ds

Set	Items	Description
S1	2307	(AUCTION? OR DUTCHAUTION? OR DUTCH()AUCTION? OR REVERSE()-AUCTION?) OR EBAY OR ONLINE()COM OR "ONLINE.COM"
S2	130	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (5N) (RULE? ? OR POLICY -OR POLICIES OR CONDITION? ? OR AGREEMENT? OR GUIDELINE? OR GUIDE()LINE? OR PARAMETER? OR REQUIREMENT? OR SPECS? OR SPECIFICATION? OR REGULATION? OR QUALIFICATION?)
S3	161	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (LEVEL OR LEVELS OR BEHAVIOR? OR BEHAVIOUR? OR SUBMISS?)
S4	286	(BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING OR BIDDER?) (3N) (HIGH? ? OR HIGHEST OR LOW? ? OR LOWEST OR COMPETITIVE? OR NON()COMPETITIVE?)
S5	300	S1 AND (S2 OR S3 OR S4)
S6	4	S5 AND (REWARD? OR PENALT?)
S7	4	RD (unique items)



7/5/1

DIALOG(R) File 139:EconLit

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492572

**TITLE: The Effect of Bid Withdrawal in a Multi-object Auction**

AUTHOR(S): Porter, David P.

AUTHOR(S) AFFILIATION: U AZ

JOURNAL NAME: Review of Economic Design,

JOURNAL VOLUME & ISSUE: 4 1,

PAGES: 73-97

PUBLICATION DATE: February 1999

AVAILABILITY: <A

HREF="http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm">Publisher's URL</A>

ISSN: 1434-4742

DOCUMENT TYPE: Journal Article

ABSTRACT INDICATOR: Abstract

ABSTRACT: The Federal Communications Commission currently utilizes a simultaneous multi-round ascending bid **auction** to allocate Personal Communication Services licenses. In the **auction**, participants are allowed to withdraw standing bids at a **penalty**. The **penalty** is equal to the maximum of zero or the difference between the value of the withdrawn bid on a license and the **highest bid** after the withdrawal on that license. The withdrawal **rule** is designed to assist **bidders** wishing to assemble combinations of licenses who find themselves stranded with an assortment of licenses for which their bids sum to more than their value. This paper reports results of experiments that examine the effect of the withdrawal rule in environments in which losses can occur if packages of licenses must be assembled piecemeal. The experiments demonstrate that there is a tradeoff with using the rule: efficiency and revenue increase, but individual losses are larger. Furthermore, the increased efficiency does not outweigh the higher prices paid so that bidder surplus falls in the presence of the withdrawal rule.

DESCRIPTOR(S) (1991 to Present): **Auctions** (D440

DESCRIPTOR(S) (Pre-1991): Microeconomics--Theory of **Auction** Markets (0227

COMPANY NAMES (DIALOG GENERATED): Federal Communications Commission ; Personal Communication Services

7/5/2

DIALOG(R) File 139:EconLit

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351318

**TITLE: Lessee Behavior Under a Resource Rent Tax**

AUTHOR(S): Ramoo, Ratha T.

AUTHOR(S) AFFILIATION: U CA, Santa Barbara

PUBLICATION INFORMATION: University of California at Santa Barbara

Department of Economics Working Paper: 12-93 PAGES: 23

PUBLICATION DATE: December 1993

AVAILABILITY: Copies available from: Working Papers Coordinator, Department of Economics, University of California at Santa Barbara, CA 93106

PRICE: no charge

DOCUMENT TYPE: Working Paper

ABSTRACT INDICATOR: Abstract

ABSTRACT: The resource rent tax is a proposed tax instrument for offshore oil and gas leases. Essentially, it is an ex post fiscal device levied on the investor's net cash flow after a specified threshold rate of return on his investment has been achieved. The tax base is obtained by using the specified threshold rate to compound forward the investor's net cash flow until a positive cumulative figure is reached. Subsequently, a resource rent tax is applied to the positive net

present value as it is realized. While the resource rent tax rate is established by the government, the threshold rate of return may be determined in one of three ways. It could be fixed by the government, negotiated between the government and the investor, or it may be **auctioned** via **competitive bidding**. This paper is concerned with the incentive effects of the resource rent tax. More specifically, I examine the critical role played by property rights in the efficiency of the system. To this end, a partial equilibrium framework is employed to investigate how a resource is valued and how capital inputs are allocated by a firm under a resource rent tax. The model is used to analyze the impact of public regulation on private decision making and the results are compared with a system of **competitive cash bonus bidding** now used to award leases to federal tracts. My results support the broad proposition that alternative institutional arrangements are important to consequent enterprise conduct and performance. Where property rights are inhibited, as is the case under the resource rent tax, a direct connection between productivity and **reward** is severed and production will be less economically efficient. Further, the incentive to detect and police managerial conduct is also reduced. Ultimately, these potential perverse incentive effects of the resource rent tax reduce the value of the lease and lead to lower government revenue.

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DESCRIPTOR(S) (1991 to Present): Market Structure and Pricing: General (D400); Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Firm (H320); Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy (includes OPEC policy) (Q380)

DESCRIPTOR(S) (Pre-1991): Market Structure: Industrial Organization and Corporate Strategy (6110); Microeconomics--Theory of Production (0223); Energy (7230); Conservation and Pollution (7220); Natural Resources--General (7210)

7/5/3

DIALOG(R) File 139:EconLit

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315381

**TITLE: Theory and Misbehavior in First Price Auctions : Comment**

AUTHOR(S): Cox, James C.; Smith, Vernon L.; Walker, James M.

AUTHOR(S) AFFILIATION: U AZ; U AZ; IN U

PUBLICATION INFORMATION: University of Arizona Economics Working Paper: 91-4 PAGES: 36

PUBLICATION DATE: April 1991

AVAILABILITY: Copies available from: Department of Economics, Bldg #23, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721

PRICE: \$2 Canada and U.S.; \$3 Overseas by air

DOCUMENT TYPE: Working Paper

ABSTRACT INDICATOR: Abstract

ABSTRACT: We reply to Harrison's and to Kagel's and Roth's critique of our work in **auction** theory and behavior. Harrison's metrics require cardinality to justify his statement that foregone utility is "too small"; as heuristics to aid experimental design, we show why his measures are not informative. Further, our experiments with variable **rewards** and opportunity costs show that, contrary to Harrison's argument, subjects do not become more risk neutral with increased **reward**. Kagel's and Roth's critique contains many errors based primarily on their misunderstanding of various risk averse models of Nash equilibrium **bidding behavior**. Thus, they report data claiming to support, but which in fact are contrary, to Harrison. They also report new tests which claim to falsify CRRAM, but because of their misinterpretations, are not inconsistent with CRRAM.

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DESCRIPTOR(S) (1991 to Present): **Auctions** (D440); Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual (C910); Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty (D810)

DESCRIPTOR(S) (Pre-1991): Microeconomics--Theory of **Auction** Markets (0227); Experimental Economic Methods (2150); Organization and Decision Theory (5110); Microeconomics--Agent Theory (0228)

7/5/4

DIALOG(R)File 139:EconLit

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289325

**TITLE:** Rewards , **Experience and Decision Costs in First Price Auctions**

**AUTHOR(S):** Smith, Vernon L.; Walker, James M.

**AUTHOR(S) AFFILIATION:** U AZ; IN U

**JOURNAL NAME:** Economic Inquiry,

**JOURNAL VOLUME & ISSUE:** 31 2,

**PAGES:** 237-45

**PUBLICATION DATE:** April 1993

**ISSN:** 0095-2583

**DOCUMENT TYPE:** Journal Article

**ABSTRACT INDICATOR:** Abstract

**ABSTRACT:** Consistent with a model of asymmetric risk aversion, subjects in first price **auctions** consistently bid above the risk neutral Nash prediction. It has been argued that this is due to low opportunity cost of deviating from the risk neutral bid. The authors increase opportunity cost (and payoff levels) by factors of 0, 1, 5, 10, and 20 from the normal levels generating payoffs up to \$250 for risk neutral subjects and observe an insignificant increase in the slope of individual bid functions. The RMSE of bids declines significantly. This is consistent with a **reward /decision cost model of bidding behavior**.

DESCRIPTOR(S) (1991 to Present): **Auctions** (D440)

DESCRIPTOR(S) (Pre-1991): Microeconomics--Theory of **Auction** Markets (0227)

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